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Should The Proud Dragon Repent?
A Relative Theory for China’s State Capitalist Banking
Sector Based On East Asia’s Experience
YUEH-PING (ALEX) YANG*
Abstract
Amidst the U.S.-China trade war, China’s banking sector, the backbone
of China’s economy, plays a key role in this battle. China’s banking sector,
however, poses a puzzle to contemporary studies of state-owned banks
(“SBs”). According to the property right theory, the mainstream SB theory,
SBs are negative for the financial and economic development of an economy
because it is susceptible to more serious agency problems, excessive political
intervention, and conflict of interest between state regulators and state
owners. That said, the economic success of China, whose banks are mostly
owned and controlled by the Chinese party-state supports the development
theory, a minority theory that highlights the development function of SBs in
mobilizing domestic investible funds to support strategic industries.
To have a clearer understanding of China’s banking sector, I engage in
the debate between the property right theory and the development theory by
comparing the experience of four East Asian developmental states, Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. After comprehensively reviewing the
banking evolution in these economies, I put forward a “relative theory” to
account for SBs. I argue that the relative success and failure depends on the
relative efficiency of the state sector vis-à-vis the private sector in promoting
development. In the early stage of an economy’s development, the private
sector might have collective action problems to come up with a coherent
development policy for the economy; hence, the state sector is relatively
better positioned in allocating the investible fund, and its ownership of banks
thus promotes development. Nevertheless, as an economy develops and the
* Assistant Professor at National Taiwan University Department of Law. Harvard Law
School S.J.D. (2017). This paper was presented at the 4th Workshop on Comparative Business
and Financial Law held by the American Society of Comparative Law Younger
Comparativists Committee at Fordham Law School in February 2018. The author is grateful
for the comments received on this paper from Professors Reinier H. Kraakman, Mark Wu,
Virginia Harper Ho, Martin Gelter, Andrew Schwartz, Timothy Webster, Maria Lucia
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corresponding institutions mature, the private sector might become relatively
more efficient in allocating the investible fund, which demands the state to
reduce its intervention in the banking sector. According to this relative
theory, the success of China’s SBs in promoting economic development
might not be sustainable. At some point, the Chinese party-state would need
to readjust its role. That said, this does not necessarily lead to the
privatization of SBs in China. As East Asia’s experience suggests, there may
be a variety of ways for China to transition to a banking system that is less
dominated by the party-state. The current trade war might offer this turning
point as it evolves into a finance war.
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A proud dragon repents; fullness is not sustainable!!
— The Book of Changes, Qian Diagram
I. Introduction
The U.S.-China trade war has gradually evolved into a finance war.
Trade sanctions adopted by the United States not only impacted directly on
the trade performance of Chinese business sectors but also threatened the
stability of China’s financial sectors indirectly. The near-bankruptcy of
Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Co. (“ZTE”) in 2018 after the
United States banned its companies from selling hardware and software to
ZTE illustrated the financial impact of the trade war on Chinese enterprises.1
After several bankruptcy cases emerged in China in 2018, the Supreme
People’s Court of China also warned that the trade war might lead to a
bankruptcy wave among Chinese enterprises.2 As the risk of corporate
bankruptcy escalates, the threat to Chinese commercial banks, the major
creditors of China’s corporate sectors, has also become increasingly real.
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”), China’s largest bank,
admitted in 2018 that the trade war had the potential of threatening the bank
stability.3 Recently, the United States has started to aim at China’s banking
sector even more directly. In 2019, the District Court for the District of
Columbia found three large Chinese commercial banks in contempt because
they refused to comply with subpoenas in investigating violations of North

1. Jeb Su, How The U.S. Export Ban Effectively Bankrupts China’s Telecom Giant ZTE,
FORBES (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2018/04/17/how-the-u-sexport-ban-effectively-bankrupts-chinas-telecom-giant-zte/#1b744041720c;
Claire
Ballentine, U.S. Lifts Ban That Kept ZTE From Doing Business With American Suppliers,
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/business/zte-ban-trump
.html.
2. Sidney Leng, Many Chinese Companies ‘Will Go Bankrupt’, If US Delivers on Tariff
Threats, Court Newspaper Warns, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 25, 2018),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2156810/many-chinese-comp
anies-will-go-bankrupt-if-us-delivers.
3. Engen Tham & Shu Zhang, China’s Top Bank ICBC Flags Trade War Risks as
Profits Rise, REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-icbc-results/china
s-top-bank-icbc-flags-trade-war-risks-as-profits-rise-idUSKCN1LF1W3; Evelyn Cheng,
Beijing is Holding Firm, but Many Chinese Firms Acknowledge They’re Worried About the
Trade War, CNBC (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/12/us-china-trade-warmany-chinese-firms-acknowledge-business-worries.html.
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Korean sanctions,4 and the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the fines.5
Considering that this action can cut off these Chinese banks from the U.S.
financial system, it has the potential to cause a panicking effect on China’s
banking system. In sum, as the U.S.-China trade war escalates, China’s
financial sector might gradually become the next battlefield.
China’s financial sector, featuring a gigantic banking sector dominated
by the Chinese party-state,6 can be resilient or fragile. Backed by the partystate, Chinese commercial banks are less susceptible to market panics and
runs.
The party-state’s leadership can further coordinate Chinese
commercial banks to rescue troubled sectors and prevent financial
turbulence. In 2019, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission
(“CBIRC”), China’s banking and insurance regulator, directed Chinese
commercial banks to support the under-financed rural areas.7 People’s Bank
of China, the central bank of China, also indicated that it would coordinate
China’s large SBs to finance leading securities firms to support China’s nonbanking financial sector.8 These instances illustrate the coordinating and
rescuing functions of a banking system dominated by the party-state. That
said, the high leverage in China’s economy casts doubts on the capability of
the Chinese party-state in supporting China’s economy. After all, China’s
total stock of corporate, household, and government debt has neared 304

4. Spencer S. Hsu, Chinese Bank Involved in Probe on North Korean Sanctions and
Money Laundering Faces Financial ‘Death Penalty’, WASH. POST (June 24, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/chinese-bank-involved-in-probe-on-north-kore
an-sanctions-and-money-laundering-faces-financial-death-penalty/2019/06/22/0ccef3ba-81b
e-11e9-bce7-40b4105f7ca0_story.html.
5. Spencer S. Hsu, In First, U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Contempt Fines Against Three
Chinese Banks in North Korean Sanctions Probe, WASH. POST (July 30, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/in-first-us-appeals-court-upholds-contempt-fin
es-against-three-chinese-banks-in-north-korean-sanctions-probe/2019/07/30/18585108-ae3
8-11e9-8e77-03b30bc29f64_story.html.
6. For studies on China’s party-state-dominated banking sector, see Yueh-Ping (Alex)
Yang, Crouching Tigers and Hidden Dragons on the Great Wall Street: Decoding the
Corporate Governance of Chinese Commercial Banks, 28(1) WASH. INT’L L.J.1 (2019)
[hereinafter “Crouching Tigers and Hidden Dragons”]; Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang, The Cloud
for Dragons and the Wind for Tigers: Bank Governance Reform in China and an ExecutiveBased Proposal, 24(2) STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 47 (2019) [hereinafter “Cloud for Dragons and
Wind for Tigers”].
7. Norihiko Shirouzu & Yilei Sun, China Banking Regulators Tell Banks to Boost
Support for Rural Economies, REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/
article/china-economy-loans-rural/china-banking-regulators-tell-banks-to-boost-support-forrural-economies-idUSL3N20X04N.
8. Liang Hong & Denise Jia, China Urges Big Brokerages to Support Smaller NonBanks, CAIXIN (June 18, 2019), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-06-18/china-urges-bigbrokerages-to-support-smaller-non-banks-101428013.html.
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percent of its gross domestic product (“GDP”) in the first quarter of 2019,
which might keep climbing as the trade war continues.9 More troublingly,
because the party-state intervenes in the lending decision of commercial
banks for long, which compromises the loan quality, the rescuer itself might
need to be rescued when the economy goes down. In 2019, several Chinese
commercial banks went into financial troubles: In May, Baoshang Bank
became the first bank failure case in China over the past two decades, leading
to CBIRC’s takeover. Later on, Bank of Jinzhou, a Hong Kong-listed bank,
encountered liquidity risks, leading to the suspension of the trading of its
shares in Hong Kong. Heng Feng Bank, one of the twelve national banks in
China, further went into restructuring due to the credit crisis.10 These
instances alarm the Chinese party-state that the cracks in the armor might be
appearing.
To better understand the strength and weakness of China’s banking
sector, the theories of SBs can shed us more lights. SBs have received more
attention in the post-financial-crisis era. For one thing, the Global Financial
Crisis of 2007-2008 (the “Global Financial Crisis”) highlighted the
countercyclical function of SBs. Much literature has devoted to examining
how the state can use SBs to maintain credits during an economic recession
and prevent cyclical credit crunches.11 For another, bank bailouts adopted
by the Treasury of the United States heated the discussion.12 To provide

9. Amanda Lee, China’s Total Debt Rises to Over 300 Per cent of GDP as Beijing
Loosens Borrowing Curbs to Boost Growth, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 7, 2019),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3018991/chinas-total-debt-rises-ov
er-300-cent-gdp-beijing-loosens.
10. Orange Wang, China’s Small Banks Still Struggling to Obtain Funds to Lend Three
Months After First Bank Failure in 20 Years, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3022948/chinas-small-banks-still-s
truggling-obtain-funds-lend-three.
11. See e.g., Martin Cihak & Asli Demirguc- Kunt, Rethinking the State’s Role in
Finance, 13-15 (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. WPS 6400, 2013); Ata Can
Bertay et al., Bank Ownership and Credit over the Business Cycle: Is Lending by State Banks
Less Procyclical? (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. WPS 6110, 2012); Eva
Gutierrez et al., Development Banks: Role and Mechanisms to Increase their Efficiency, 8-9
(World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. WPS 5729, 2011). See also Alejandro Micco &
Ugo Panizza, Bank Ownership and Lending Behavior, 93 ECON. LETTER 248 (2006); Eduardo
Levy Yeyati et al., A Reappraisal of State-owned Banks, 7(2) ECONOMIA 209, 224, 231-32
(2007).
12. For related debates about the government ownership of banks in the U.S. context,
see J. W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice,
27:2 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (2010); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government
is the Controlling Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293 (2011); Barbara Black, The U.S. as
“Reluctant Shareholder:” Government, Business, and the Law, 5:2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS.
L.J. 561 (2010); Benjamin A. Templin, The Government Shareholder: Regulating Public
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additional liquidity to credit markets and prevent failures of systemically
important financial institutions, the U.S. Congress established the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) in October 2008,13 which resulted in the
Treasury’s equity injection14 of around $205 billion into 707 financial
institutions.15 The concession of the United States, the leader of the liberal
camp, to state ownership of banks during the Global Financial Crisis
evidences the practical importance of SBs.16
Contemporary studies, however, generally discredit SBs. The property
right theorists argue that state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) incur more
serious moral hazard problems and agency problems than private firms17 and
thus suspect that the state can operate SBs efficiently. Specifically, they have
three major concerns. First, SBs incur more serious agency problems
because they are owned by the government which is essentially owned by all
taxpayers and thus have the most dispersed ownership structure and most
serious separation of ownership from control problem.18 Second, SBs

Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62:4 ADMIN. L. REV. 1127 (2010); Matthew R. Shahabian,
The Government as Shareholder and Political Risk: Procedural Protections in the Bailout,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 351 (2011); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government is
the Controlling Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 409 (2010);
Saule T. Omarova, Bank Governance and Systemic Stability: The “Golden Share” Approach,
68(4) ALABAMA L. REV. 1029 (2017); Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang, Government Ownership of
Banks: A Curse or a Blessing for the United States?, 10(3) WILLIAM & MARY BUS. L. REV.
667 (2019).
13. For an introduction to the U.S. government’s investment under the TARP, see HAL
S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND
REGULATION 78-82 (21st ed., 2016).
14. Kahan & Rock indicated that the TARP originally aimed at stabilizing the financial
system by authorizing the Treasury to engage in purchase of troubled assets from troubled
financial institutions, but the Treasury took advantage of the broad definition of “troubled
assets” to obtain the entitlement to purchase shares of troubled financial institutions. Kahan
& Rock, supra note 12, at 1309-10. Shahabian also reviewed legislative history and suggested
that Congress, when passing the TARP, intended equity purchase to be only a secondary tool
to toxic assets purchase. Matthew R. Shahabian, supra note 12, at 357-58.
15. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Capital Purchase Program, http://www.treasury.
gov/initiatives/financial-stability/programs/investment-programs/cpp/Pages/capitalpurchase
program.aspx (last visited Aug. 18, 2019).
16. See IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR BETWEEN
STATES AND CORPORATIONS? 21-22 (2010).
17. Related literature often cites Armen Alchian as the leading proponent of the property
right theory. See generally Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 II
POLITICO 816 (1965). For other literature following this line, see Enrico Perotti, State
Ownership: A Residual Role? (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 3407, 2004).
18. See generally Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 II POLITICO
816 (1965). For a summary of the agency problems intensified in GOBs, see I. Serdar Dinc,
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typically implicate political intervention under which politicians influence
SBs to serve their interests instead of public ones.19 Third, the government
acts as both the regulator and owner of SBs and thus have conflicting
interests which prevent it from providing a level playing field for all banks.20
China, however, challenges the wisdom of contemporary studies.
Compared with the United States and the European Union, which were
seriously hit by the Global Financial Crisis, China’s economy was relatively
successful. Between 2010 and 2018, the world’s GDP grew by US$ 19.75
trillion, of which China contributed US$7.52 trillion, or 38 percent of the
world’s growth.21 Parallel to its economic success, China has maintained an
authoritarian party-state regime dominated by the Chinese Communist Party
(“CCP”).22 CCP heavily dominates China’s economy through the so-called
“state capitalism” model.23 This model also extends to China’s banking
sector. Most major Chinese banks are under the state’s ownership. As of
spring 2019, among the fifty largest domestic commercial banks in China,

Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-owned Banks in Emerging
Markets, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 453, 454 (2005).
19. See generally Jacob Yaron, State-owned Development Finance Institutions (SDFI):
Background, Political Economy and Performance Assessment, at 10-14, http://www.iadb.org/
res/publications/pubfiles/pubs-492.pdf (2004).
20. Gutierrez et al., supra note 11, at 4-5.
21. World Bank Open Data, GDP – World & China, https://data.worldbank.org/indic
ator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2018&locations=1W-CN&start=2010 (last visited Aug. 18,
2019).
22. For a comprehensive discussion of the CCP’s influence in China’s political regime,
see RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST RULERS
(2010). To be sure, by using the term “party-state,” I do not suggest that CCP is a unitary
party system which has only one voice from the top. CCP’s party system is complicated. The
central party system contains different factions pursuing different values and interests. The
central party system also possesses different horizons with the local party system, and the
former cannot always discipline the latter. Each local party system also pursues different local
interests and often competes with each other. For a discussion of how the different factions
within the CCP affect China’s monetary policies, see VICTOR SHIH, FACTIONS AND FINANCE
IN CHINA: ELITE CONFLICT AND INFLATION (2008).
23. See, e.g., Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National) Champions:
Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013);
Li-Wen Lin, State Ownership and Corporate Governance in China: An Executive Career
Approach, 3 COLUMBIA BUS. L. REV. 743 (2013); Curtis J, Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng,
Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEORGETOWN L.J. 665
(2015). See also BENJAMIN L. LIEBMAN & CURTIS J. MILHAUPT EDS., REGULATING THE VISIBLE
HAND? THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM (2015) [hereinafter
REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND]. For a thorough introduction to the state capitalism around
the world, see BREMMER, supra note 16.
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only two do not have state controlling shareholders.24 Taken together, it
appears that SBs do not compromise China’s economic development.
China explains its relative success by a faction of conventional
development economics which offers a development theory for SBs.
According to this theory, when a state cannot create a friendly environment
for private investment, direct state ownership of production can substitute.25
Specifically, for countries where under-developed economic institutions
hinder private banks from supporting economic growth, the state’s
ownership of banks can fill the gap and improve the general welfare.26 This
developmental account of SBs provides theoretical support for China’s
repeated claims that the party’s leadership is necessary for developing
China’s economy.27
In this paper, I propose a relative theory to harmonize the property right
theory and the development theory and account for the partial success and
upcoming challenges of China’s SBs. I argue that the success of China’s
SBs might contain a temporal element, depending on the relative strength
and weakness of private sectors vis-à-vis state sectors in developing China’s
economy. In the early development stage of an economy, the state sector
perhaps mobilizes the development more efficiently. Nevertheless, as an
economy develops, the state’s relative advantage would gradually decline
while its relative disadvantage becomes more prominent. When the critical
intersection arrives, reducing the state’s intervention and leaving more space
to private sectors would become more efficient. Hence, it is a matter of
finding a balance between the state and private sectors. China’s success by
far might reflect efficient use of the state sector in its earlier phase of
development, but this may be unsustainable. At some point, China will need

24. They are China Minsheng Bank and Ping An Bank.
25. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer, State versus Private Ownership, 12:4 J. ECON. PERSP. 133
(1998); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Role of the State in Financial Markets, in THE INTERNATIONAL
BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 19 (World Bank, 1994).
26. After the Global Financial Crisis, academics also take note of the countercyclical
role of SOBs. See generally Martin Cihak & Asli Demirguc- Kunt, Rethinking the State’s
Role in Finance, 13-15 (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. WPS 6400, 2013);
Gutierrez et al., supra note 11, at 8-9. Ata Can Bertay et al., Bank Ownership and Credit over
the Business Cycle: Is Lending by State Banks Less Procyclical? (World Bank Pol’y Res.,
Working Paper No. WPS 6110, 2012).
27. See, e.g., People’s Congress, Decision regarding the Outline of the Thirteenth FiveYear Plan on National Economy and Social Development (第十二届全国人民代表大会第
四次会议关于国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要的决议), Chapter 2 (Mar. 16,
2016); The Standing Committee of People’s Congress, Working Report (全国人民代表大会
常务委员会工作报告), para. 4(3) (Mar. 9, 2016).
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to readjust the party-state’s role in the banking sector, and the U.S.-China
trade war might trigger this point.
To support the proposed relative theory, I employ a comparative method
based on the experience of four East Asian economies. Before China
emerged, East Asia was the region of “economic miracles” which produced
the most astonishing growth after World War II.28 Japan was the most
prominent example, whose strong economic performance in the 1980s
amazed the world at a similar level with current China. Other than Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore all delivered impressive
economic performance during this period.29 More importantly, except for
Hong Kong, these East Asian economies did not belong to the neoliberalist
camp.30 Instead, they achieved economic success by adopting the
unorthodox model of “developmental states” featuring a mix of market
economy and heavy governmental intervention.31 The government’s control
of finance is a particularly important element for it to exert influence over
the investment pattern of their economies and guide sectoral mobility.32 The
cases of these East Asian neighbors, similar to China, supported the
development theory for SBs.
Nevertheless, the later development of these East Asian developmental
states also cautions against the sustainability of the SB model. After the

28. WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1993).
29. See infra Section III.B.
30. RODRIK, supra note 79, at 18-20.
31. See generally Meredith Woo-Cumings, Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the
Politics of Nationalism and Development, in THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 1 (Meredith WooComings ed., 1999); HA-JOON CHANG, THE EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE: THE
MIRACLE, THE CRISIS AND THE FUTURE (2006). In an abstract, developmental states possess
the following characteristics. First, there is an interventionist state that is neither socialist nor
free-market, but a plan-rational capitalist developmental state conjoining private ownership
with state guidance. Second, nationalism is a motivation, at least in East Asia’s practice, to
the extent that these states face challenges from Western imperialism and use economic
development to ensure their national survival. Third, the state partners with business sectors
by formulating broad economic plans, identifying the means for implementing it and ensuring
competition in designated strategic sectors.
32. Woo-Cumings, id. at 10-13. Other important elements include: First, the state is
governed by a group of elite state bureaucracy which is capable and less captured by social
interest groups. Second, the state develops the economy largely through industrial policies,
under which the state designates specific sector for prioritized development, invests in capital
to finance it and creates a friendly business environment to support it. Third, the state’s trade
policies also help developing its economy, in particular through the protection of the infant
industry and the promotion of export. Fourth, the state’s competition policy is managed in the
sense that the state is concerned about excessive and destructive competition and thus
deliberately creates an oligopolistic market structure to exploit scale economy.
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splendid performance in the 1980s, they all experienced economic
turbulence in the 1990s. The government’s domination of the banking
system was also under attack. In response, all four economies more or less
reduced the government’s intervention in banking systems in the 1990s and
2000s.33 These instances evidence that even though the SB model may
facilitate the initial development, it is difficult to sustain for good.34 Drawing
lessons therefrom, China should not over-claim the relative success of its SB
model, especially when it is about to proceed to the next level of
development. The recent slowdown of economic growth and the
accelerating banking risks in China are sending the warning signal.
That said, the experience of East Asian developmental states offers a
variety of ways to reach state-private balance in the banking sector. Each of
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore adopted different approaches to
transition toward a banking system that is less dominated by the government,
which range from regulatory reforms, ownership privatization, market
entries, to management professionalization. Depending on its economic and
political backgrounds, China can develop its SB reforms to pursue
development while controlling the negatives of concern to property right
theorists. Specifically, privatization is not the only way forward: observers
should not judge China’s reform efforts solely based on if it engages in
ownership privatization.
This paper can contribute to comparative finance and corporate
governance literature in at least three aspects. First, it analyzes the potential
benefits and challenges of Chinese SBs, which facilitates a better
understanding of China’s banking sector. Second, it puts forward a
perspective for observing the banking evolution in East Asia which features
the developmental state model. This lays down a theoretical framework for
future envisagement of an East Asian financial theory. Last but not least, it
harmonizes the debate between the property right theory and the
development theory by proposing the relative theory as a middle ground.
This theoretical intervention offers a more balanced and accurate account of
the pros and cons of the SB practice.
I will structure this paper as follows. In Section II, I will introduce the
SB practice in China to exhibit the theoretical debate between the property
right theory and the development theory under the current SB studies. In
33. See infra Section IV.A.
34. Dani Rodrik offered an accurate observation of the developmental state model. While
the unorthodox tools employed by the developmental states may help to reach growth in the
infant stage of an economy, these tools might not be sustainable. To sustain growth, it requires
more extensive institutional reform, such as independent judiciaries, stabilizing fiscal policy,
political democracy, financial supervision, etc. In the end, the state’s intervention has to exit
gradually to move the economy forward. RODRIK, supra note 79, at 13-55.

4 - Yang_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete)

Summer 2020]

4/24/2020 2:38 PM

Should the Proud Dragon Repent?

269

Section III, I put forward the first half of the relative theory to illustrate how
SBs can promote economic development in the early stage of an economy
by reviewing the SB practice of four East Asian economies in their early
development phases. In Section IV, I proceed to the second half of the
relative theory to illustrate the challenges faced with by SBs as the economy
develops, again, by reviewing the transition adopted by the four East Asian
economies in the 1990s. Section V is the conclusion. Overall, the proposed
relative theory cautions that the success of China’s SB model is perhaps
unsustainable. The Chinese party-state should learn from the Chinese
classics and realize that a proud dragon, at some point, should repent.
II. State Ownership of Banks and the State Capitalist China
State ownership of banks is a controversial topic. Mainstream studies
follow the property right theory and disfavor this practice. In recent years,
however, the revised property right theorists seem to provide a more
balanced account for the SBs. China’s emergence further revives the longforgotten development theory.
A. Contemporary Perception of State-Owned Banks
1. The Property Right Theory
Mainstream literature, based on the property right theory, disfavors the
SB practice. Its rationale is simple: there is no guarantee that the government
will benevolently and efficiently operate SBs. According to it, SBs entail at
least three major problems.
First, SBs incur more serious agency problems. According to the
property right theory, since SBs are owned by the government which is
essentially owned by all taxpayers, they have the most dispersed ownership
structure that entails the most serious separation of ownership from control.35
Government officials in charge of SBs are thus subject to less supervision
and incur more serious agency problems. They are also less capable of
operating banks well because they typically have little business experience
in banking. Therefore, SBs are inherently less efficient than private banks.36

35. See generally Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 II POLITICO
816 (1965). For a summary of the agency problems intensified in GOBs, see Dinc, supra note
18, at 454.
36. See, e.g., James R. Barth et al., Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?,
13 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 205, 240 and 245 (2004); Alejandro Micco et al., Bank Ownership
and Performance: Does Politics Matter?, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 219 (2007).
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Second, SBs incur political intervention. SBs are owned by the
government which is operated and supervised by politicians, thus their
activities are subject to politicians’ influence. Since politicians typically care
their interests, they will influence SBs to serve their interests instead of
public ones.37 For instance, it is empirically found that SBs tend to increase
loans in election years, which is a product of the political intervention.38
These political loans typically lack solid credit support and thus may easily
become nonperforming and harm the safety and soundness of SBs. By
extending loans to political cronies instead of productive projects, SBs also
fail to invest their funds efficiently, resulting in financial repression in other
productive sectors.39
Third, SBs also involve regulatory and competitive concerns. The
government is both the regulator and owner of SBs and thus has conflicting
interests that prevent it from providing a level playing field for all banks.
For instance, to secure SBs’ market power, the regulator might refuse private
or foreign entry in the banking market, which leads to a less competitive
banking market. In exercising its regulatory power, the government may
also treat SBs nicer than private banks, resulting in regulatory forbearance
and unfair advantage in favor of SBs.40 These would all negatively affect
the financial development of an economy.
Based on the above, the property right theorists argue that the potential
advantages of SBs tend to be an illusion.41 Mainstream empirical studies
also appear to support the property right theory. The most influential piece
came from La Porta et al. in 2002: based on data of SBs from 92 countries,
they found that state ownership of banks in 1970 was associated with slower

37. See generally Jacob Yaron, State-owned Development Finance Institutions (SDFI):
Background, Political Economy and Performance Assessment, at 10-14, http://www.iadb.org/
res/publications/pubfiles/pubs-492.pdf (2004).
38. See, e.g., Giuliano Iannotta et al., The Impact of Government Ownership on Bank
Risk, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 152 (2013); Dinc, supra note 18; Paola Sapienza, The Effects
of Government Ownership on Bank Lending, 72:2 J. FIN. ECON. 357 (2004).
39. See, e.g., Rainer Haselmann et al., Real Effects of Bank Governance: Bank
Ownership and Corporate Innovation (CEPR, Discussion Paper No. DP7488, 2009).
40. Gutierrez et al., supra note 11, at 4-5.
41. For a further analysis of how the corporate governance weakness of SOBs appears
in practice, see David H. Scott, Strengthening the Governance and Performance of StateOwned Financial Institutions, 3-4 (The World Bank, Fin. & Private Sector Dev., Fin. Systems
Dep’t, Pol’y Res. Working Paper No. WPS4321, 2007).
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subsequent financial development and lower subsequent growth in per capita
income.42 Other studies during that period also reached similar findings.43
a.The Revised Property Right Theory
Recent literature, however, perceives SBs less negatively. According
to the updated findings which I term as the “revised property right theory,”
the negatives of SBs as enumerated above can be controlled by some
institutions of an economy. For instance, a competitive financial market can
motivate government officials to run SBs efficiently because being
outperformed by other banks might hurt their reputation and hinder their
future promotion.44 A transparent and uncorrupted political system can
prevent government officials from tunneling the bank asset for political
purpose and thus secure the operational efficiency of SBs.45 According to
the revised property right theory, the effects of SBs depend on the institutions
of an economy, and developed economies tend to possess necessary
institutions to control the negatives of SBs.
Several empirical studies lend support to this perspective. For instance,
Rafael La Porta et al. themselves found that the negative effects of SBs were
more significant in financially underdeveloped economies or economies
with poor protection of property rights.46 Marcia Million Cornett et al. found
that SBs in East Asia performed more poorly than private banks in 1997 to
2000 (i.e., during the Asian Financial Crisis) but no longer the case in 200142. Rafael La Porta et al., Government Ownership of Banks, 57:1 J. FIN. 265, 266 (2002).
43. See, e.g., Gerard Caprio & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Avoiding Disasters:
Policies to Reduce the Risk of Banking Crises, 25 (World Bank mimeo & Egyptian Center for
Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 47, 2000); James R. Barth et al., Banking Systems Around
the Globe: Do Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?, 27 (The World
Bank Dev. Res. Group, Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 2325, 2000).
44. Douglas W. Caves and Laurits R. Christensen, who compare the performance of
government-owned Canadian railroads and private railroads in a competitive environment,
find that both perform equally well. They explain this finding by arguing that market
competition may have the ability to overcome inefficiency resulted from government
ownership. Douglas W. Caves & Laurits R. Christensen, The Relative Efficiency of Public
and Private Firms in a Competitive Environment: The Case of Canadian Railroad, 88:5 J.
POL. ECON. 958, 958 (1980). Other literature also finds that government-owned firms may be
as efficient as private firms in competitive environments, provided that there is sufficient
competition between these two firms and that the government does not provide discriminative
regulations and subsidies in favor of government-owned ones. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining,
Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the
Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-owned Enterprises, 32 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (1989).
45. Tobias Korner & Isabel Schnabel, Public Ownership of Banks and Economic
Growth: The Impact of Country Heterogeneity, 19(3) ECON. OF TRANSITION 407, 435 (2011).
46. La Porta et al., supra note 42, at 290.
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2004 (i.e. after the crisis). They interpret this change as consistent with a
life-cycle model, under which financial globalization brought about
competition and thus pressured SBs to improve their banking policy.47
Tobias Korner and Isabel Schnabel found that the negative effects of SBs
found by La Porta et al. vanished in economies with highly developed
financial systems and advanced political institutions.48 At even higher levels
of financial development, the effect of SBs even became positive and large.49
These findings suggest that the potential negatives of SBs are controllable.
B. The State Capitalist China and Its Party-State-Dominated Banking
Sector
Neither the property right theory nor the revised property right theory
can explain China. China is one of the most successful economies in the
world. At the same time, it maintains a banking system that is highly
dominated by the party-state and claims that this system results in its
economic success.
a. An Overview of China’s Economy and Banking
Today, no one would ever underestimate the economic power of China.
After four decades of super growth, China’s gross domestic product (“GDP”)
has skyrocketed to US$13.61 trillion as of 2018, which accounted for 15.86
percent of the world GDP.50 What makes China’s economic success even
more miraculous is its speed and constancy. In 1978, China’s GDP was only
US$ 147 billion, ranking tenth among world economies.51 This represents
more than 92 times of GDP growth in forty years. Moreover, China has
maintained this rate of growth in a steady manner. Except for 1989 and 1990,
for forty years China managed to maintain its GDP growth rate at above 5

47. Marcia Million Cornett et al., The Impact of State Ownership on Performance
Differences in Privately-owned versus State-owned Banks: An International Comparison, 19
J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 74 (2010).
48. See generally Korner & Schnabel, supra note 45. See also Svetlana Andrianova et
al., Government Ownership of Banks, Institutions and Economic Growth, 79 ECONOMICA 449
(2012).
49. Korner & Schnabel, supra note 45, at 420-21.
50. World Bank Open Data, GDP – China, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.
GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2018&locations=CN-1W&start=1960 (last visited Aug. 18, 2019).
51. Classora Knowledge Base, Ranking of the World’s Richest Countries by GDP
(1975), http://en.classora.com/reports/t24369/general/ranking-of-the-worlds-richest-countr
ies-by-gdp?edition=1978&fields= (last visited Aug. 18, 2019).
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percent.52 This speedy and steady growth unsurprisingly made China a
successful case from which other developing countries are eager to derive
lessons.
In the course of China’s economic growth, its commercial banks played
an extremely crucial role. China’s banking sector is the major funder of its
economy.53 In 2018, China’s bank credits equaled for 161 percent of China’s
GDP, while in the United States this figure was only 52 percent.54 In contrast,
the market capitalization of listed domestic companies equaled for only 46
percent of China’s GDP, while in the United States this figure was 149
percent.55 As of June 2019, China’s non-financial sectors received RMB 213
trillion of finance from the financial sector, of which loans accounted for
78.2 percent, corporate bonds accounted for 9.9 percent, and stock accounted
for only 3.3 percent respectively.56 Consequently, unlike the United States
where economic activities obtain funds mainly from capital markets, China’s
economy heavily relies on banks.57
China’s banking sector started to develop since the reform and openness
in 1978.58 At the end of 2018, the total assets of Chinese commercial banks
had reached RMB 203.41 trillion.59 This giant banking sector is comprised
of four main types of banks: state-owned commercial banks (“SOCBs”, with

52. World Bank Open Data, GDP Growth – China, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN (last visited Aug. 18, 2019).
53. For an overview of China’s overall financial system, see Franklin Allen et al.,
China’s Financial System: Growth and Risk, 9:3-4 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS® IN FINANCE
197 (2015).
54. World Bank Open Data, Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks – US & China,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FD.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS?locations=CN-US (last visited
Aug. 18, 2019).
55. World Bank Open Data, Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies – US
& China, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS?locations=CN-US
(last visited Aug. 18, 2019).
56. PBOC, The Statistics Report of the Scale of Social Finance Stock as of June 2019
(2019年6月社会融资规模存量统计数据报告) (July 12, 2019), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/
2019-07/12/content_5408834.htm.
57. To be fair, China is not exceptional in this. Many advanced countries, such as Japan
and Australia, adopt this bank-based model as well. In Japan, bank credits equaled for 108
percent of Japan’s GDP in 2018; in 1998, this figure used to skyrocket to 196 percent. In
Australia, this figure was 140 percent in 2018. World Bank Open Data, Domestic Credit to
Private Sector by Banks – Japan & Australia, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FD.A
ST.PRVT.GD.ZS?locations=JP-AU (last visited Aug. 18, 2019).
58. For a comprehensive introduction to the banking evolution in China, see LI ZHI-HUI,
DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM OF CHINA’S BANKING SYSTEM 12-17 (2012).
59. CBIRC, http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/doc/9106/910601/C990691733D644B39582D
EFA3EF1EF69.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2019).
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46 percent market share by asset),60 joint-stock commercial banks (“JSCBs,”
with 23 percent market share),61 city commercial banks (“CCBs,” with 17
percent market share),62 and rural financial institutions (including rural
commercial banks “RCBs”63 and other rural banking institutions, together
with 17 percent market share).
b.The Corporate Governance Model of China’s SBs
While there is an increasing amount of studies on China’s state
capitalism and its implication with corporate governance, they mostly focus
on Chinese SOEs.64 Relatively fewer studies concentrated on the corporate
governance of Chinese SBs,65 the major financier of China’s state capitalism.
To fill this gap, in a separate paper, I conduct a comprehensive analysis of
the corporate governance practice of Chinese SBs.66 Below I briefly
summarize these findings to give an overview of how China’s state
capitalism manifests in the banking sector.
The Chinese party-state dominates China’s banking sector in at least
three aspects. First, it is the ultimate owner of China’s banking sector. Most
major Chinese banks are under the state’s ownership. Through the Central
60. SOCBs are the largest type of commercial banks in China. The majority of their
shares are owned by the central government via either the Central Huijin Investment Company
(“Central Huijin”) or the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”).
61. JSCBs are the national commercial banks that are not the SOCBs. The CCP approved
their incorporation mostly during the late 1980s or 1990s to introduce market competition in
the national banking market. They are mostly owned by SOEs or local governments.
62. CCBs refer to commercial banks incorporated based on city credit cooperatives. In
the 1980s and 1990s, to develop the local economy, the Chinese government permitted the
incorporation of city credit cooperatives to supply the finance. As these cooperatives exposed
to heightened risks in the 1990s, the Chinese government approved their restructuring into
CCBs to weather the local financial crisis. Most CCBs are owned and controlled by local
governments and the associated local party system.
63. RCBs refer to local commercial banks which are required to extend a certain portion
of their loans to local peasants, agriculture, and economic development of rural villages.
CBRC, TEMPORARY REGULATIONS ON ADMINISTRATION OF RURAL COMMERCIAL BANKS (农
村商业银行管理暂行规定), arts. 2 & 46 (Ch.). Most RCBs are owned and controlled by
local governments and their associated local party systems.
64. See e.g., Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 23; Lin, supra note 23; Milhaupt & Zheng,
supra note 23.
65. For the literature specifically addressing the corporate governance of Chinese SBs,
see Nicholas Calcina Howson, China’s Restructured Commercial Banks: Nomenklatura
Accountability Serving Corporate Governance Reform?, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL
MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL IMPACT 123 (Zhu Min et al., eds., 2009); Yang,
Crouching Tigers and Hidden Dragons, supra note 6.
66. See Yang, id. at 9-31.
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Huijin Investment Company (“Central Huijin”) and the Ministry of Finance
(“MOF”), the Chinese party-state holds majority ownership of all five
SOCBs. Through the central government, local governments, or SOEs, the
Chinese party-state also owns ten of the twelve JSCBs which are the secondtier national banks as mentioned above.67 This ownership structure is unlike
the government ownership of banks in the United States during the Global
Financial Crisis. Although the U.S. Treasury held extensive ownership of
707 financial institutions during that period, most of its holdings were
minority holdings and meant to be temporary.68 Instead, the Chinese partystate holds controlling stakes in Chinese banks on a long-term basis.
Second, the Chinese party-state is the human resource headquarter of
China’s banking sector. Instead of passively owning banks, it actively
engages in the personnel decisions of banks through CCP’s party system. In
most cases, regardless of the ownership structure of a bank, CCP effectively
controls the appointment of its executive team, such as the board’s
chairperson, the supervisory board’s chairperson, the chief executive officer
(“CEO”), vice presidents, and other important positions.69 For banks at the
central level, this appointment power lies in either the Central Organization
Committee or the CBIRC.70 For banks at local levels, such power lies in the
organization departments of the local party system in charge of the region.71
Most senior managers at Chinese commercial banks bear party ranking and
are thus subject to CCP’s promotion system, rotation of jobs, and discipline
of misbehaviors.72 By exercising this appointment power, CCP ensures that
the executive teams of Chinese commercial banks serve the state’s policies
and the party’s interests.
67. As of 2019, only the China Minsheng Bank and Ping An Bank were not owned by a
state controlling shareholder.
68. Except for the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, American Insurance Group, and Citi
Group, the U.S. Treasury only held minimal ownership of the bailed-out financial institutions.
For more detailed summaries of these bailout investments, see Steven M. Davidoff,
Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal Corporate Ownership in the Midst of the Financial Crisis,
95 MINN. L. REV. 1733 1736-56 (2011). See also Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring,
Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61:3 ADMIN. L. REV.
463 (2009).
69. LIU PENG (刘鹏), ZHONGGUO SHANGYE YINHANG BIANGE YU ZHUANXING: JINJI
SHICHANGHUA ZHONG SHANGYE YIHANG DE ZUOYONG YU KECHIXU FAJAN (中国商业银行
变革与转型：经济市场化中商业银行的作用与可持续发展) 170 (THE REFORM AND
TRANSFORMATION OF CHINESE COMMERCIAL BANKS: THE ROLE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN PROCESS OF ECONOMIC MARKETIZATION) (2014).
70. Sebastian Heilmann, Regulatory Innovation by Leninist Means: Communist Party
Supervision in China’s Financial Industry, CHINA Q. 1, 17-18 (2005).
71. LIU, supra note 69, at 170.
72. Id.

4 - Yang_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete)

276

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

4/24/2020 2:38 PM

[Vol. 43:2

Third, the Chinese party-state is a crucial customer to Chinese banks.
It is reported that only one-third of bank loans flowed to private sectors,73
which suggests the public sector’s capture of Chinese banks. Moreover, the
Chinese party-state fiscally backs the public sector and thus implicitly
guarantees public borrowings, which makes loans to public sectors safer than
those to private sectors.74 In this context, the preferential lending in favor of
the public sector in China75 is not necessarily the product of state intervention
but rather banks’ own rational decision.
Through the above ties, coupled with its inherent regulatory power, the
Chinese party-state tightly controls Chinese commercial banks. This allows
the party-state to mobilize domestic investible funds toward targeted sectors
to implement its economic plans, which is a crucial element of Chinese state
capitalism.76 To be fair, this development model is not unprecedented. As
will be discussed later in detail, many East Asian economies, including
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, adopted similar models known
as “the developmental state” in the 1980s to pursue development and
growth.77 The hand of the Chinese party-state, however, stretches farther and
deeper.
c. Summary: The China Puzzle
China’s prevalent use of SBs and its tremendous economic success
poses a puzzle to contemporary SB studies. If the property right theory is
correct, China’s widespread use of SBs should result in serious financial and
economic underdevelopment.
That did not happen in China.
Notwithstanding the economic turbulence in the late 1990s and early

73. NICHOLAS R. LARDY, MARKETS OVER MAO: THE RISE OF PRIVATE BUSINESSES IN
CHINA 99-112 (2014).
74. Evan Oxhorn, Consumer Finance and Financial Repression in China, 7 U. PENN
EAST ASIA L. REV. 397, 410-11 (2012).
75. Some estimated that SOEs could have easy access to loans at a third of the market
interest rate. Shaun Breslin, Financial Transitions in the PRC: Banking on the State?, 35:6
THIRD WORLD Q. 996, 1003 (2014).
76. BREMMER, supra note 16, at 134-35.
77. For an overview of the development model of East Asian developmental states, see
WOO-COMINGS, MEREDITH ED., THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE (1999). For a discussion of how
such developmental model affects the corporate governance practice in East Asia, see YuehPing (Alex) Yang, Envisaging an East Asian Model of Corporate Governance: A
Developmental State Perspective, in LEGAL THOUGHTS BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST IN
THE MULTILEVEL LEGAL ORDER: A LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR HERBERT
HAN-PAO MA 445 (Chang-Fa Lo et al. eds., 2016).
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2000s,78 the party-state’s domination of the banking sector has not brought
devastating results to China’s finance and economy. To the contrary, China’s
economy outperformed many other large economies which adopted more
market-oriented reforms.79
The revised property right theory cannot explain the China puzzle as
well. According to the revised property right theory, only in developed
economies with advanced financial and political institutions can SBs
function well. China, however, does not fall into this category. It remains a
developing country. Its legal and political institutions are never satisfactory
according to the global standard. Its financial institutions, such as market
competition and banking professionals, are catching up, but they can hardly
be characterized as advanced. Their business model remains traditional,
which relies heavily on interest-bearing activities such as loans: by the end
of 2018, non-interest revenue only accounted for 22.1 percent of the overall
revenue of Chinese banks.80 The relative success of Chinese SBs does not
seem to arise from robust institutions which discipline the party-state’s
operation of SBs.
III. China is “not Alone but Has Its Neighbors”
The Chinese party-state tells a different story to explain the success of
China’s SBs by advocating that the party-state’s leadership are indispensable
for China’s development.81 On this developmental account, China is “not
alone but has its neighbors.” The experience of East Asian developmental
states echoes this development theory.
A. An Overview of East Asian Developmental States
Before China emerged, East Asia was the region of “economic
miracles” which produced the most astonishing growth after World War II.
Japan was the most prominent one, whose strong economic performance in
the 1980s amazed the world at a similar level with current China. Other than
78. For a comprehensive discussion of the local banking crisis in China during this
period, see CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J.T. HOWIE, RED CAPITALISM: THE FRAGILE FINANCIAL
FOUNDATION OF CHINA’S EXTRAORDINARY RISE (2011).
79. DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 14 (2007).
80. CBIRC, The Table of Major Regulatory Indicators of Commercial Banks (Legal
Persons) (2018) (商业银行主要监管指标情况表(法人) (2018年)) (Feb. 25, 2019), http://
www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/doc/9106/910601/3954F0B0DF6C47F2AB36C1085791F448.html.
81. See supra note 27.
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Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore all delivered
impressive economic performance during this period. More importantly,
except for Hong Kong, these East Asian economies did not belong to the
neoliberalist camp.82 Instead, they achieved economic success by adopting
the unorthodox model of “developmental states” featuring a mix of market
economy and heavy governmental intervention.83
Developmental states utilize the relative efficiency of the government
versus the market. Summarizing the experience of Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan, and Singapore, studies highlighted that developmental states
featured the government’s role in the economy.84 They argued that, for
latecomer economies whose private institutions are too underdeveloped to
kick-start economic development, a development-minded government may
be better positioned than the market to ignite development. Such
government can accumulate limited investible capital, pick and choose the
industrial sectors for prioritized development, and allocate capital to them to
create a “big push” for the economy.85 Under this theory, the government’s
control of finance is particularly important for it to influence the investment
pattern of the economy and guide sectoral mobility. At least from a
consequentialist perspective, the economic success of East Asia
demonstrates the practical merits of the developmental state model.86
B. Banking Systems in East Asian Developmental States
The heavy hand of a plan-rational developmental state particularly
presides in the banking sector. After all, finance is “the nerve of the

82. RODRIK, supra note 79, at 18-20.
83. See generally Meredith Woo-Cumings, Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the
Politics of Nationalism and Development, in THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 1 (Meredith WooComings ed., 1999); HA-JOON CHANG, THE EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE: THE
MIRACLE, THE CRISIS AND THE FUTURE (2006).
84. Id. In an abstract, developmental states possess the following characteristics. First,
there is an interventionist government that is neither socialist nor free-market, but a planrational capitalist developmental state conjoining private ownership with state guidance.
Second, nationalism is a motivation, at least in East Asia’s practice, to the extent that these
economies face challenges from Western imperialism and use economic development to
ensure their national survival. Third, the government partners with business sectors by
formulating broad economic plans, identifying the means for implementing it and ensuring
competition in designated strategic sectors.
85. For a more in-depth discussion of the rationale behind East Asian developmental
states, see CHANG, supra note 31, at 109-133, 227-256.
86. Chang comprehensively studied how the initial conditions in East Asia before the
1960s lagged behind those in Sub-Saharan Africa, which shows that East Asia’s economic
success was not based on initial conditions. Id. at 143-175.
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developmental state.”87 Below I consult the experiences of four main East
Asian economies, i.e., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, to
illustrate how they controlled their banks.
1. Japan: A Government-Directed Banking System
Among the East Asian developmental states, Japan was the leading
pioneer.88 Throughout the 1960s to 1980s, Japan achieved marvelous
economic growth, which brought it from ashes and ruins after World War II
to the third-largest economy in the world now. Its economic growth was
miraculously rapid since the 1960s89 and continued until 1990. From 1960
to 1990, Japan’s GDP grew from US$44.3 billion to US$3.1 trillion,90 which
is equal to 70 times growth. Japan’s emergence shocked the global economy
and attracted many studies of the secret behind Japan’s economic success.91
Japan’s economic model during this period is nonetheless unorthodox.
Observers identified several key characteristics leading to Japan’s economic
success, such as the well-known main bank system, keiretsu, lifetime
employment, etc.92 This special bank-business-labor relationship reached a

87. Woo-Cumings, supra note 31, at 10.
88. Chalmers Johnson provided a pioneer study of the Japanese developmental state in
1982, which commenced the studies of East Asian developmental states. See generally
CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL
POLICY, 1925-1975 (1982).
89. In 1961, Japan’s GDP growth was 12.04 percent, which commenced its golden eras.
90. World Bank Open Data, GDP – Japan, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.
GDP.MKTP.CD?end=1990&locations=JP&start=1960 (last visited Aug. 18, 2019).
91. Earlier studies produced different schools of thoughts on the success of Japan’s
economy, including the “national character-basic values-consensus” view highlighting the
cultural difference, the “no-miracle-occurred” view highlighting the contribution from free
market and private sectors, the “unique-structural-features” view highlighting several unusual
Japanese institutions, the “free-ride” view highlighting the beneficiary of Japan’s postwar
alliance with the United States, and the “developmental state” view. For the summary, see
JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 7-19.
92. See generally Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm,
28:1 J. ECON. LITERATURES 1 (1990). In brief, after World War II, capital markets in Japan,
which used to be robust before the war, stagnated and never revived since then, rendering
Japan a bank-led economy. Since large private banks were the major source of funds for
enterprises, they became the center supporting finance to a group of businesses, supervising
their financial performance and taking the necessary intervention on the board when financial
conditions deteriorate (the main bank system). Businesses also grouped with and depended
on each other, cross-holding the shares of each other, which established strong business ties
among each other (the keiretsu system). Businesses, in turn, guaranteed their employees the
lifetime employment, which incentivized the on-the-job training of employees and the
development of their company-specific skills (the lifetime employment system). For
arguments claiming that these characteristics were all urban legends, contra YOSHIRO MIWA
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fine balance during this period and contributed to Japan’s economic success.
Most importantly, Japan did not achieve success by merely adopting freemarket prescriptions. The Japanese government, in particular, the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (“MITI”), played an arguably leading
role.93 Its influence in the banking system was, in particular, a key to
pursuing its industrial policies.
Japan’s banking system during the 1960s to the 1990s featured a twotier system. The first tier was the private banking sector, comprised of city
banks, regional banks, cooperatives, trust banks, etc., which provided shortterm credits,94 as well as the long-term credit banks providing long-term
credits.95 The second tier was the government banks, including the Japan
Development Bank (“JDB”) and Export-Import Bank, which provided longterm loans to large firms in strategic industries, and the Japan Finance
Corporation for Small Business and People’s Finance Corporation which
provided loans to small firms. They were all wholly owned by the Japanese
government. Most importantly, they were backed by Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications, which attracted postal savings (a form of deposits)
from public savers and funded these government banks according to the
Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan (“FILP”) co-managed by the Ministry of
Finance and MITI.96
The Japanese government dominated or at least guided Japan’s banking
system. On the one hand, it guided government banks to channel their funds
to serve policy purposes. MITI played an influential role here. Taking JDB
for instance, although it decided its credit allocation independently from the
government in principle, in practice, MITI actively “recommended” JDB to

& J. MARK RAMSEYER, THE FABLE OF THE KEIRETSU: URBAN LEGENDS OF THE JAPANESE
ECONOMY 61-88 (2006).
93. MITI’s tools included control over foreign exchange, imports of technology,
preferential financing, tax breaks and protection from competition, which allowed it to select
industries for nurturing and regulated cut-throat competition. JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 199.
Such intervention, in particular, the industrial policies, played a crucial role in the success of
Japan’s economy during this period. Johnson offered a comprehensive analysis of the MITI’s
role in Japan’s industrial policies. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 88.
94. The six main banks in Japan in that period were Fuji, Sanwa, Daiichi, Mitsui,
Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo banks.
95. The three major long-term credit banks were the Industrial Bank of Japan, the LongTerm Credit Bank of Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank.
96. JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 210. While the FILP funding provided enormous funds
to support government policies, it was separated from the government budget and was thus
subject to less scrutiny of the Diet (i.e., the Congress in Japan). JOHNSON, supra note 88, at
211 (reporting that “from 1953 on FILP had always been from a third to half of the size of the
general account budget and had ranged from a low of 3.3 percent (1956) to a high of 6.3
percent (1972) of GNP”).
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lend to individual firms97 through its power to screen all loan applications
and placement of its retired senior officials on JDB’s board.98 Although
government lending institutions only accounted for no more than 20 percent
of all bank loans in Japan,99 their loans bear indicative effect for private
banks.100
On the other hand, in respect of the larger part of Japan’s banking
system, i.e. private banks, the Japanese government also possessed some
leverage. Although it did not own and control these banks, it arguably
employed several tools to direct their support of the government’s industrial
policies. The famous one was the directed loans through “administrative
guidance.”101 During the high-growth period, Bank of Japan (“BOJ”),
Japan’s central bank, controlled bank credits through the so-called “window
guidance” practice, which not only implemented BOJ’s monetary policy102
but also supported the allocation of resources. To do it, BOJ had regular
meetings with private banks, during which it instructed their lending plans.
Private banks, in turn, prepared their lending plans broke down by sectors,
the size of borrowers, and use of funds and sent to BOJ for approval. In

97. Akiyoshi Horiuchi & Qing-Yuan Shi, Influence of the Japan Development Bank
Loans on Corporate Investment Behavior, 7 J. JAPANESE & INT’L ECON. 441, 447 (1993).
98. JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 209-10.
99. Richard A. Werner, A Reconsideration of the Rationale for Bank-Centered Economic
Systems and the Effectiveness of Directed Credit Policies in the Light of Japanese Evidence,
30:3 JAPANESE ECON. 3, 7 (2002). For a detailed summary, see Masami Imai, Political
Determinants of Government Loans in Japan, 52:1 J.L. & ECON. 41, 45 (2009).
100. Although the scale of loans of government banks was low relative to that of private
city banks, their loans implied the government’s support of the borrowers, which could
comfort private banks’ concerns. For instance, JDB loans, flowing mostly to MITI’s
designated strategic industries, were perceived the “MITI’s seal of approval” on an enterprise,
which had an “information effect” that indicated a desirable direction of credit expansion.
JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 211 (reporting that during 1953-55, 83 percent of JDB loan went
to four strategic industries designated by MITI: electric power, ships, coal, and steel.) For the
empirical evidence of the information effect of JDB loans, see Horiuchi & Sui, supra note 97.
101. Some academics considered Japan as the first country which employed directed loans
successfully. Werner, supra note 99, at 8. For an introduction to the evolution of directed
loans in Japan, see Werner, supra note 99, at 20-27.
102. For discussion of the monetary function of window guidance in Japan, see generally
Takeo Hoshi et al., Japanese Corporate Investment and Bank of Japan Guidance of
Commercial Bank Lending, in JAPANESE MONETARY POLICY 63 (Kenneth Singleton ed.,
1993); James R. Rhodes & Naoyuki Yoshino, Window Guidance by the Bank of Japan: Was
Lending Controlled?, 17:2 CONTEMPORARY ECON. POL’Y 166 (1999); Tomoyuki Fukumoto
et al., Effectiveness of Window Guidance and Financial Environment – in Light of Japan’s
Experience of Financial Liberalization and a Bubble Economy, BANK OF JAPAN REV. 1 (Aug.
2010).
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essence, BOJ’s approval was merely an administrative guidance103 that was
not legally binding. BOJ, however, possessed several regulatory powers to
ask for banks’ cooperation, such as the power to cut rediscount quotas,
reduce window guidance quotas, or apply unfavorable terms to banks’
transactions with BOJ.104 Fearing regulatory retaliation, Japanese banks
tended to follow BOJ’s direction.105 Therefore, the Japanese government
could direct the loans of private banks to industries prioritized by the
government even though it did not own or control private banks.106

103. Administrative guidance refers to the authority of the government to issue directives,
requests, warnings, suggestions, and encouragements to the enterprises within a particular
ministry’s jurisdiction. JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 265. Administrative guidance became
more salient since the 1960s because MITI lost its power to manage foreign exchange budget
then because it failed to enact the Special Measures Law to continue its control power
statutorily. For a thorough discussion of administrative guidance in Japan’s early development
era, see JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 242-74. For a different view arguing that administrative
guidance never really worked in Japan, see YOSHIRO MIWA & J. MARK RAMSEYER, THE FABLE
OF THE KEIRETSU: URBAN LEGENDS OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 115-46 (2006).
104. On the other hand, several implicit governmental protection also allowed the
Japanese government to provide carrots to private banks and ask for their cooperation. For
instance, through rationing the financial market, the Japanese government made banks the
major financiers in the economy, which in turn ensured their business opportunity. The
Ministry of Finance also controlled lending and deposit rates, which guaranteed the minimum
profits of bank loans. BOJ also supplied finance to private banks and thus implicitly
guaranteed their loans, which relieved the financial risks of private banks. Last but not the
least, the Japanese government, in general, controlled the competition in the banking market
by restricting financial products, controlling the incorporation of branches, and limiting
foreign entry, etc., so that banks would not engage in excessive competition that undermined
their profit margins. It was reported that the total BOJ lending to commercial banks and other
financial institutions for preferential credits to strategic industries amounted to 10 percent of
the total money supply (M2) in the early 1950s. Yoon Je Cho & Thomas Hellmann, The
Government’s Role in Japanese and Korean Credit Markets: A New Institutional Economics
Perspective, at 11 (World Bank Policy Res. Working Paper, No. WPS-1190, 1993). Thanks
to all these regulatory protections, private banks could concentrate on expanding their share
of loans. In return, they were requested to enter in each new industry fostered by MITI,
resulting in the so-called “one set-ism” phenomenon, that is, each bank keiretsu, in the end,
possessed “a full complement of companies covering all the government-designated growth
industries, regardless of whether it made business sense to do so.” JOHNSON, supra note 88, at
206.
105. JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 266. See also Werner, supra note 99, at 8. For a detailed
discussion of the administrative guidance in Japan, see Allan D. Smith, The Japanese Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and Administrative Guidance: The Labyrinth and
the Castle, 16 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS 417, 424-33 (1984).
106. This formulated an industrial system characterized by the “pattern of dependence.”
As illustrated by Chalmers Johnson, under this pattern, a group of enterprises borrowed from
a major private bank in an amount exceeding their capacity to repay, which might stand for
about 70 percent-80 percent of their operational capital. The bank, in turn, over-borrowed
from BOJ. Through this system, BOJ obtained control over the policies and lending decisions
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To be sure, academics are still debating whether the Japanese
government exercised such influence effectively. For one thing, different
departments within the Japanese government had different policy horizons,
which incurred coordination problems.
MITI might be the most
development-minded department, but its influence over banks was rather
limited, while the Ministry of Finance and BOJ might have more effective
tools, but their horizons were more soundness-oriented than developmentoriented.107
Besides, private enterprises might have initiated the
development plan first while the Japanese government simply followed suit
strategically.108 Accordingly, whether and to what degree did the Japanese
government guide domestic finance for development purpose, and lead to
Japan’s economic success remain controversial among academics. That
said, it is fair to say that Japan maintained a government-directed banking
system bearing similar nature with China’s banking system at least in many
regulatory aspects, such as window guidance, directed loans, interest rate
control, implicit government guarantee, limited foreign entry, etc.
a. South Korea: A Government-Owned Banking System
South Korea is another East Asian developmental state which achieved
tremendous economic growth during this period.109 From 1960 to 1995, the
GDP of South Korea grew from US$3.9 billion to US$559.3 billion,110 which
was equal to 143 times growth. Except for 1962 and 1980, in these 35 years,
South Korea managed to maintain at least 5 percent annual GDP growth rate.
of private banks. The private banks, in turn, could dominate their borrowing enterprises,
formulating the famous bank keiretsu system in Japan. JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 203-05.
In the 1980s, however, when financial liberalization and deregulation rose in Japan, the
Japanese government found it more difficult to implement its administrative guidance. For
instance, the BOJ’s window guidance received less compliance in the 1980s, which eventually
led to the demise of this practice in 1991. See generally Rhodes & Yoshino, supra note 102.
107. Johnson, for instance, argued that MITI, as the planner of industrial policy was the
pilot agency in then Japan and the center that exerted the greatest positive influence. JOHNSON,
supra note 88, at 26. In contrast, Calder provided a comprehensive account of how different
agencies in Japan had difficulty in coordinating Japan’s financial policies. See generally KENT
E. CALDER, STRATEGIC CAPITALISM: PRIVATE BUSINESS AND PUBLIC PURPOSE IN JAPANESE
INDUSTRIAL FINANCE (1993).
108. See CALDER, id. at 108-12.
109. Alice H. Amsden provided the first comprehensive analysis of the developmental
state model in South Korea, which was the pioneer study that was specific to South Korea.
See generally ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA’S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE
INDUSTRIALIZATION (1992). See also JUNG-EN WOO, RACE TO THE SWIFT: STATE AND FINANCE
IN KOREAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1991); HA-JOON CHANG, supra note 31.
110. World Bank Open Data, GDP – South Korea, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=1995&locations=KR&start=1960 (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).
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Large conglomerates known as “chaebols”111 emerged: in 1986, South Korea
had ten firms listed in Fortune 500 international private non‐oil-producing
firms, while there were only seven from all other developing countries
combined.112 In 1990, South Korea was the fifteenth largest economy in the
world by GDP.
The economic model of South Korea during this high-growth period
had two primary characteristics: a strong and interventionist government as
well as large diversified business groups (i.e., chaebols),113 which formed a
reciprocal relationship. Due to the colonial history and the authoritarian
ruling, strong financiers, large businesses, or land-owners that could oppose
to the government were absent in post-war South Korea, which resulted in a
strong government.114 To maintain national security and to ensure its ruling,
however, the government wanted industrialization, in particular, the
economies of scale that could increase South Korea’s industrial
competitiveness. To achieve it, the government picked and chose targeted
firms and industries, supplied cheap finance to subsidize them, forced them
to build industries and engage in more exportation, and threatened them to
withdraw the support if they failed.115 It also artificially underpriced
domestic interest rates to encourage investment and undervalued exchange
rates to promote exportation. In return for the government’s favor, chaebols
endeavored in expanding their exportation, businesses, employment, etc., to
meet the government’s industrial plans.116 In this relationship, the
government was autonomous of private sectors to the extent that it pursued
goals independent of various industrial groups (such as security or industrial
transformation), but it did so in ways that favored large businesses.117
Under this economic model, a credit-based financial system mediated
by an interventionist authoritarian government became the basis of the
“Korea Inc.”118 The South Korean government possessed two primary tools
for controlling finance: the power to price financial products and the
111. Chaebol refers to family-owned and -managed groups of companies that exercise
monopolistic and oligopolistic control in product lines and industries. They are similar to
keiretsu in Japan, except that they do not own banking institution at their core. Instead, the
government mediates the flow of capital (including domestic and foreign ones) to the chaebol
through a “designated bank.” WOO, supra note 109, at 149-50.
112. AMSDEN, supra note 109, at 9.
113. Other features of South Korea’s economic model included an abundant supply of
competent salaried engineers and low‐cost yet well‐educated labor. Id. at 8-11.
114. Id. at 147.
115. WOO, supra note 109, at 191-92.
116. AMSDEN, supra note 109, at 146.
117. WOO, supra note 109, at 14.
118. Id. at 149.
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ownership of banks.119 In respect of the former, through the Ministry of
Finance, the South Korean government possessed the power to set the
deposit rate and interest rate, and it consciously underpriced the rates to
promote industrial investment. The price was serious financial repression in
South Korea between the 1950s and 1970s,120 featuring negative real interest
rate charged by banks and low savings in South Korea.121
In respect to government ownership, the banking system in South Korea
was “the most extreme case of dependence on the state.”122 Unlike Japan,
the South Korean government essentially owned all banks before the 1980s,
including commercial banks and development banks.123 This allowed the
South Korean government to control nearly all capital flows in South Korea
and allocate credits on a discretionary basis,124 especially to extend loans
with favorable rate to targeted firms and/or industries.125 Under this
119. Id. at 191. AMSDEN, supra note 109, at 16.
120. “Financial repression” typically involves the government’s establishment of
unattractive yields on domestic financial assets and allocation of scarce capital to selective
groups of favored entrepreneurs. WOO, id. at 60. Financial repression was arguably what
“imparted strength” to the South Korean government. WOO, id. at 191.
121. Id. at 60. The low-interest-rate retarded the accumulation of domestic savings and
discouraged foreign lending, which hampered investment and economic growth. Thus, in
1965, South Korea initiated the interest rate reform to increase the interest rate to mobilize
domestic time and savings deposits. As a result, domestic time deposits and savings deposits
rose. In response to the rising interest rate, chaebol became dependent on foreign loans to
finance their investment. The high-interest-rate era between 1965 and 1972, however, was
ended when the government bailed out highly-leveraged businesses by issuing a moratorium
on all payment of corporate debts owed to the curb market and ended all market liberalization
reforms: real interest rate again went down. Id. at 103-05, 111-15. Under the low-interest-rate
policy, business and government savings kept flowing to the banking system, which, in turn,
financed major industries at cheaper rates. Household savings, however, flowed to the curb
market, which, in turn, financed small and medium enterprises that had no access to bank
loans. This presented a “bifurcation of the financial market.” The average cost of borrowing
in curb market during 1974-1980 was reportedly higher than that of general bank loans by
25.2 percentage points. Id. at 159-60.
122. Id. at 11.
123. This began in 1961 when the military government, led by the later President Park
Chung-Hee, launched the coup and took over the power. The military government, acting
against the United States’ policy recommendation, nationalized all South Korean banks.
124. The only exception was the curb market. On the one hand, due to the rationed credit
market, small enterprises which failed to be favored by the government could not borrow in
the formal banking market and thus had no choice but to turn to the curb market, which created
the demand for credits. On the other hand, due to the low-interest-rate environment,
households were less incentivized to deposit their money in the formal banking system than
to inject their money into the curb market for higher returns, which created the supply of
credits. It was estimated that in 1971, the size of the curb market accounted for at least onethird of bank loans. For more discussion, see WOO, supra note 109, at 111-15.
125. AMSDEN, supra note 109, at 72-74, 149.
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governance structure, bankers acted like bureaucrats than entrepreneurs,
whose primary concerns were GDP instead of profits.126
Even in the 1980s, when South Korea was compelled to commence
financial liberalization and bank privatization,127 the government’s control
over the banking system did not diminish much. The government privatized
all SBs by 1983.128 At the same time, however, fearing that chaebols might
acquire privatized banks and become too-big-to-control, the government
prohibited any single shareholder from holding more than 8 percent
ownership of a national commercial bank.129 Thanks to the dispersed
ownership structure, the government continued controlling commercial
banks after the privatization.130
This government-dominated banking system contributed to two main
results: the post-war development of South Korea’s economy and the
expansion of chaebols.131 On the one hand, the South Korean government
126. WOO, supra note 109, at 159. See also Yung-Chul Park & Dong-Won Kim, Korea:
Development and Structural Change of the Banking System, in THE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
OF JAPAN, KOREA, AND TAIWAN: GROWTH, REPRESSION, AND LIBERALIZATION 188, 189 (Hugh
T. Patrick & Yung-Chul Park eds., 1994). To be sure, the ownership of these banks might be
largely in private hands in the 1960s and 1970s; however, they were “de facto public
enterprises” to the extent that voting rights of private shareholders were legislatively limited.
Gregory W. Noble & John Ravenhill, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly? Korea, Taiwan and
the Asian Financial Crisis, in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF
GLOBAL FINANCE 80, 92 (Gregory W. Noble & John Ravenhill eds., 2000).
127. South Korea was forced to liberalize its finance in the 1980s for two primary reasons:
First, to respond to the increasing pressure for trade liberalization from the international
community, notably the United States, and second, to address the rising NPL problems. WOO,
id. at 192.
128. In 1978, the government initiated the first bank privatization case, followed by
another in 1981. By 1983, all seven banks in South Korea were privatized. Id. at 195.
129. Chaebol, however, tried certain ways to circumvent this shareholding restriction. For
instance, they bought stocks in more than one bank to increase their influence in the whole
banking system. They also used their subsidiaries to hold the ownership of banks. For
instance, insurance companies owned a lot of bank stock, while chaebols controlled insurance
companies. Samsung, for instance, was the largest shareholder of Commercial Bank and Hanil
Bank in 1989, the two largest nationwide commercial bank in South Korea. Despite so,
chaebol was still far from controlling the banking system. Instead, the South Korean
government, through its rediscount function and the implicit guarantee of defaults, still
extensively controlled privatized banks. Park & Kim, supra note 126, at 195-96. See also id.
at 196.
130. Specifically, the government continued intervening in the management of banks by
frequently rotating offices between bank management and governmental posts. For instance,
in February 1991, the monetary authorities stepped in to name the presidents of five major
banks. Through these intervening powers, the government kept its power to decide policy
loans and allocate credits. AMSDEN, supra note 109, at 135; WOO, id. at 196; Noble &
Ravenhill, supra note 126, at 93. Park & Kim, id. at 192.
131. WOO, id. at 15.
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determined the allocation of credit based on export performance.132 Between
1974 and 1980, the average cost of all loans for export industries was nearly
always cheaper than loans to domestic industries.133 Besides, coinciding
with the shift of industrial policies toward heavy industries in this period, the
average cost of borrowings for heavy industries was significantly lower than
light industries.134
On the other hand, the South Korean government tended to favor large
enterprises, i.e. chaebols. In the same period, large enterprises always
incurred less borrowing cost compared with small firms.135 There were two
reasons for that. First, since the industrial policies in this period supported
heavy industries, which were capital intensive and could only be met by large
chaebols, bankers in South Korea naturally followed the government’s
policies and supported chaebols. Second, under this banking system, the
lending rates were at an artificially low level with a ceiling. Thus, bankers
in South Korea had no incentives to seek out enterprising yet riskier projects.
Instead, they would prefer safer projects, that is, loans to chaebols favored
by the government.136 Chaebols in South Korea thus grew and became too
big to fail.137

132. To be sure, foreign investment also played a crucial role during South Korea’s postwar growth period. In the 1970s, foreign loans in South Korea increased significantly: it was
found that between 1965 and 1978, South Korea’s reliance on foreign financial markets
increased for almost 100 times. Id. at 152-53. Foreign banks were willing to lend to South
Korea mostly due to political reasons: they believed that the American government, out of
political needs, would support the South Korean government and acted as the last resort. This
formed the primary source of fund financing the Big Push industrial policies toward heavy
industries in the 1970s. Id. at 153-58. Foreign credits, however, flowed into South Korea
mostly via the government-owned banking system. Thomas Kalinowsky & Hyekyung Cho,
The Political Economy of Financial Liberalization in South Korea, 49:2 ASIAN SURVEY 221,
224 (2009).
133. WOO, id. at 167.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 166-67.
136. Id. at 166-68.
137. In 1978, the top twenty chaebols contributed to one-third of South Korea’s GDP. Id.
at 15. See also id. at 172-75.
The South Korean government also favored chaebols by relaxing the regulation of non-bank
financial intermediaries (“NBFIs”). NBFIs were investment and finance companies which
engaged in commercial papers as well as life insurance companies and investment trust
companies. In the 1980s, the South Korean government engaged in a series of deregulation of
NBFIs, including the permission of private ownership, greater flexibility in interest rates,
relaxing entry barriers, removing the burden to support policy loans, expanding permitted
financial activities, etc. NBFI deposit thus soared in the 1980s from 30.1 percent of total
deposit in 1980 to 51.3 percent in 1987. Due to the deregulation, chaebols largely entered into
the NBFI market through the large-scale acquisition of NBFIs. See id. at 196-97. In this vein,
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The case of South Korea supported the idea of SBs and financial
repression. In Amsden’s words, South Korea provided “supporting evidence
for the proposition that economic expansion depends on governmental
intervention to create price distortions that direct economic activity toward
greater investment.”138
b. Taiwan: A Party-State-Owned Banking System
Taiwan was another rapidly growing East Asian developmental state
during this period. From 1961 to 1995, Taiwan’s GDP grew from US$1.78
billion to US$279.22 billion,139 which was equal to 157 times growth. In
1995, Taiwan ranked the 19th largest economy in the world.
Similar to Japan and South Korea, Taiwan also achieved its economic
success by adopting the developmental state model.140 Its features, however,
were different. Instead of relying on gigantic private business groups,
Taiwan’s economic development during its high-growth period was
characterized by dominant SOEs as well as vibrant small and medium private
enterprises (“SMPEs”).141 On the one hand, SOEs were bigger and more
the control over domestic finance in South Korea, to some extent, shifted from the government
to chaebols; liberalization in effect “contributed to a rise, not to a decline, in economic
concentration.” AMSDEN, supra note 109, at 134-36. It was reported that in 1983, 69.6 percent
of bank loans in South Korea went to 400 large firms belonging to 137 chaebols. The share
of the 50 largest chaebols in total domestic credit was 26.5 percent, while the combined share
of the three largest ones (Hyundai, Daewoo, and Samsung) accounted for over 10 percent.
WOO, id. at 170.
138. AMSDEN, id. at 14.
139. Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics of Taiwan, https://
www.dgbas.gov.tw/point.asp?index=1 (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).
140. On this, Robert Wade provided the most comprehensive study of the developmental
state model in Taiwan. See generally ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC
THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (2nd ed., 2004).
See also J. MEGAN GREENE, THE ORIGINS OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN TAIWAN: SCIENCE
POLICY AND THE QUEST FOR MODERNIZATION (2008).
141. This was partly because Taiwan’s ruling party then, Kuomintang (“KMT,”) was a
“foreign” regime to local Taiwanese people. When KMT retreated from the mainland to
Taiwan, many Mainlanders, i.e., those who came after 1949 and their dependents, migrated
to Taiwan with KMT. These Mainlanders, however, accounted for only 12 percent to 15
percent of the population in Taiwan. WADE, id. at 233. That was why “Taiwan has always
been less totalitarian than Japan between the two World Wars or South Korea during much of
the Park era.” WADE, id. at 250. As a minority ruler, KMT feared the presence of some strong
local groups that could challenge its ruling legitimacy. Accordingly, instead of supporting
large private business groups and risking giving too much power to local Taiwanese people,
KMT preferred building Taiwan’s economy on SOEs, which were under its control, and
SMPEs, which were too small to become a threat. This resulted in the “SOEs+SMPEs” model
in Taiwan.
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prevalent in Taiwan than in South Korea. Since the 1950s, Taiwan possessed
“one of the biggest public enterprise sectors outside the communist bloc and
Sub-Saharan Africa.”142 These Taiwanese SOEs mostly concentrated on
sectors which were capital-intensive, large in scale, and upstream. By
controlling these sectors, the Taiwanese government obtained indirect
influence over downstream sectors, which facilitated its control of Taiwan’s
economy.143 On the other hand, unlike Japan or South Korea whose economy
was geared by large private conglomerates (either the keiretsu or the
chaebol), Taiwanese business groups played a less central role in Taiwan’s
economy.144 In their place were small family firms which were at the heart
of the economy’s manufacturing revolution.145 In light of this “SOEs +
SMPEs” model, the case of Taiwan is of more reference value to China to
the extent that CCP similarly builds China’s economy on influential SOEs
and vibrant SMPEs.146
Moreover, Taiwan was shockingly similar to China in political terms
because it also adopted a party-state regime during its high-growth period.
Similar to CCP, KMT implemented the so-called “quasi-Leninist” style of
organizational structure. As Wade described, “[t]he party’s organization
stretches from the standing committee at the top to cells in schools,
universities, factories and neighborhoods. At the higher levels it has a
structure of offices to watch over the rest of the society … Almost all senior
civilian officials and military officers are also party members, and many hold
high party offices as well. In consequence there is a constant blurring of the
142. Id. at 173. Besides, the government possessed much more influence in many other
firms which were not public enterprises. For instance, the government might take minority
share and make up the balance through KMT’s holding company. It was estimated that KMT
owned about fifty firms. Id. at 273.
143. Id. at 178-80. KMT also dominated these key sectors to prevent them from being
dominated by foreign enterprises.
144. In the 1980s, it was estimated that only 40 percent of the 500 largest manufacturing
firms in Taiwan belonged to a business group, while most of Taiwanese enterprises remained
single-unit operations. Id. at 66.
145. Id. at 66-70. This can be observed by the fact that most of Taiwan’s exports came
from small and medium firms. For instance, in 1976, the top 500 domestic firms in Taiwan
by sales accounted for only 27 percent of total exports, indicating that small and medium
enterprises also contributed significantly to Taiwan’s exportation.
146. Taiwan is similar to China in other aspects as well. In cultural terms, Taiwan is also
a Chinese society, sharing similar cultural characteristics, such as the language of Mandarin,
the philosophy of Confucianism, and other traditions. In historic terms, the government of
Taiwan during its high-growth period was KMT led by Chiang Kai-shek, which was the
former government of China before CCP took over China in 1949. After being defeated by
China, KMT fled to Taiwan with its remnant power and institutions, claiming that it was the
legitimate government of China and hoping that someday it could recover the mainland.
Accordingly, there was a historical continuation between Taiwan and China.
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distinction between the party and government at the top. The party also has
many industrial and commercial enterprises under its more or less direct
control, through which comes much of its finance.”147 This description of
KMT shockingly fits the common impression of CCP.148
Under this economic and political background, the ability to control
finance and upstream raw materials was an essential means for KMT to
possess “powerful and selective instruments of control” of the economy.149
Due to KMT’s constraint of capital markets in Taiwan, Taiwan’s financial
system was bank-led as well.150 Moreover, KMT tightly administered the
banking system. When retreating to Taiwan, KMT brought over the SBs
from China to Taiwan.151 It further nationalized Taiwanese private banks
147. Id. at 236. For a comprehensive introduction to KMT’s organizational structure,
ideology, and control over the Taiwanese society, see id. at 228-96.
148. Besides, KMT also shared a similar ideology with CCP in economic affairs.
Specifically, built on Sun Yat-Sen’s Three Principles of the People, KMT placed SOEs at the
centrality of the economy. Consider the following description of KMT, which again seems
like a description of CCP:
Any group which wants a reduction of the government’s economic role must show how such
a reduction would remain consistent with the economic principles of Sun Yat-Sen. Any group
which wants extensive denationalization must counter those who say that public enterprises
in the commanding heights are essential to those principles.
Id. at 261.
149. Id. at 270.
150. KMT, similar to Japan, South Korea, and China, preferred a bank-led economy over
an equity-based economy because it did not want businesses to have their source of finance
that could allow them to grow out of control. Therefore, it constrained the development of
capital markets in Taiwan. For instance, it controlled the stock exchange by controlling the
Securities and Futures Commission which supervised the stock exchange, which discouraged
many local businesses from listing in the stock market. LAI IN-JAW (賴英照), THE
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT OF TAIWAN’S FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE (台灣金融版圖之回顧與
前瞻) 26-38 (1997). See also LIN PAO-AN, FINANCE AND SOCIETY: POST-WAR EVOLUTION OF
TAIWAN’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND CREDITS (金融與社會：戰後臺灣金融體系與信用的演
進) 17-52 (2012). Eventually, KMT built a bank-led financial system in Taiwan which was
based on credit rather than equity. By 1980, it was estimated that bank asset accounted for 95
percent of the assets of Taiwan’s major financial institutions. Id. at 159.
That said, due to KMT’s policy to avoid creating large local business groups, it did not want
companies to have their source of finance or build conglomerates around banks. Accordingly,
it did not want a Japanese main bank system. Due to this concern, different from Japan while
similar to South Korea, KMT prohibited Taiwanese banks from taking shares in the borrowing
companies (even the development bank only began to take equity positions in 1982). It also
prohibited holding companies or non-bank financial institutions (such as insurance
companies) from owning industrial firms and restricted the growth of the official money
market. WADE, id. at 264.
151. Before migrating to Taiwan, KMT adopted a government-dominated model for
governing the banking system in China. Major Chinese banks during that period were owned
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that were incorporated during the Japanese colonial ages. Based on the
government-owned Mainland banks, nationalized local banks, and the newly
incorporated SBs, KMT built a banking system dominated by the party-state
in Taiwan.152 Besides, KMT’s quasi-Leninist ruling also extended to the
banking system. For instance, the regulations governing bank employees
essentially followed those applied to civil servants.153 KMT also appointed
senior bankers, dictated salary scales, and regulated annual bonuses of bank
staff.154 Despite KMT’s intervention, Taiwanese banks were able to make
big profits thanks to the strong demand for credits, limited competition in the
market, and the government-mandated margin between the lending rate and
borrowing rate.155
This “party-state-dominated” banking system supported Taiwan’s postwar economic development.156 Through its control of finance, KMT
channeled domestic savings to targeted sectors in various ways.
Institutionally, it incorporated several specialized banks engaging in
and operated by the government (especially local governments) and subject to policy
intervention. They were mostly the so-called “professional banks,” supplying bank finance to
specific industries or targets while incurring the waste of social resources by governments and
government-owned enterprises.
152. In 1980, there were only four private banks in Taiwan, accounting for only 5 percent
of deposits of all commercial banks, while the Taiwanese government owned and controlled
the rest seven banks. Id. at 161. For more introduction to the banking landscape in Taiwan
before the 1990s, see LAI, supra note 150, at 3-53.
In addition to government-owned financial companies, KMT also had its party-owned
financial businesses, including the China Investment and Trust, China Development
Corporation, China United Trust and Investment, Fuh-Hua Securities Finance, etc. Ya-Hwei
Yang, Taiwan: Development and Structural Change of the Banking System, in THE FINANCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, KOREA, AND TAIWAN: GROWTH, REPRESSION, AND LIBERALIZATION
288, 299 (Hugh T. Patrick & Yung-Chul Park eds., 1994).
153. WADE, supra note 140, at 264.
154. Id. at 161-62. In practice, the premier or provincial governor typically appointed
former officials in the Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank to serve the chairmen of banks.
155. Id. at 164. The benefits of this financial system were the reduction of savers’ risks
and high rate of financial savings. The costs, however, were rigidity. For instance, due to the
limited competition among banks and the control of interest rate, financial repression was
serious in Taiwan as well, which led to a robust curb market. It was estimated that the curb
market supplied around 30 percent of total loans over the 1970s, at rates 50 percent to 100
percent higher than bank loan rates. Id. at 161. Under this setting, there was similarly a
bifurcation in Taiwan’s credit markets, where large businesses, especially SOEs, financed
themselves mainly through the banking system while leaving small businesses to the curb
market. Id. at 171. For a discussion of how small businesses overcame financial repression in
Taiwan, see LIN, supra note 150, at 83-128.
156. To be sure, in addition to the banking system, the Taiwanese government also used
special-purpose funds and loan guarantees to support targeted industries or sectors. See
WADE, id. at 167-71.

4 - Yang_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete)

292

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

4/24/2020 2:38 PM

[Vol. 43:2

specialized businesses, ranging from agriculture, land, small and medium
enterprises, export-import, to development. Furthermore, it directed banks
to extend preferential lending to indicated priority industries with strong
export potential.157 In practice, Bank of Communications and Medium
Business Bank of Taiwan undertook the major duty to extend these strategic
industry loans, and about 20 percent-25 percent of their funds came from the
Executive Yuan’s Development Fund with 175 to 275 basis points lower
rate.158 In this way, KMT’s control of finance facilitated its industrial
policies and promoted Taiwan’s exportation.159
The case of Taiwan illustrates that a banking system dominated by a
party-state, together with the adoption of industrial policies based on SOEs
and SMPEs, can also create economic success.
c. Singapore: A Business-oriented Government-owned Banking
System
Singapore is another worth noted developmental state in East Asia.160
From 1960 to 1995, Singapore’s GDP grew from US$0.7 billion to US$87.9
157. For instance, in 1978 it was estimated that up to 75 percent of bank loans flowed to
these targeted industries. Id. at 166-67, 171.
158. Yang, supra note 151, at 308.
159. To be sure, Taiwan’s government-bank-industry model differed with South Korea in
scale. The amount of policy loans in Taiwan was significantly less than that in South Korea.
Most crucially, the Taiwanese government preferred to rely on tax incentives instead of policy
loans to pursue its industrial policies. Taiwan was portrayed as one of the first developing
economies to adopt tax scheme to promote development, making incentives to industries
achieving the high-performance standard, and/or engaging in strategic industries. WADE,
supra note 140, at 182-83. This was mainly due to Taiwan’s unique diplomatic status. Absent
official connection with most major international organizations (such as IMF) and countries
(such as the United States), Taiwan could hardly seek assistance from the international
community once hit by a financial crisis. Accordingly, “[t]he government [gave] particularly
high priority to economic stabilization, even at the cost of very rapid industrial restructuring,”
which limited “the use of selective credit as a primary instrument for steering the behavior of
private firms as compared to Korea.” WADE, id. at 296. Under this setting, the effect of
strategic loans in Taiwan was less prominent. WADE, supra note 140, at 191-92. See also
Yang, supra note 151, at 308 (reported that these strategic loans might have little impact:
subsidized firms reported that they would have made investments even without the
preferential loans; the loans did not reduce the cost of capital significantly, etc.)
160. See Alan Chong, Singapore’s Political Economy, 1997–2007: Strategizing
Economic Assurance for Globalization, 47: 6 ASIAN SURVEY 952, 953-54 (2007). For more
discussion, see Thomas J. Bellows, Economic Challenges and Political Innovation: The Case
of Singapore, 32:4 ASIAN AFFAIRS 231 (2006); Linda Low, The Singapore Developmental
State in the New Economy and Polity, 14:3 PACIFIC REVIEW 411 (2001); W. G. Huff, The
Developmental State, Government, and Singapore’s Economic Development since 1960, 23:8
WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1421 (1995).
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billion,161 which was equal to 126 times growth. Its economic growth was
also steady: except for 1964, 1985 and 1986, in these thirty-five years,
Singapore managed to maintain at least 4.5 percent of annual GDP growth
rate.162 After five decades of development, Singapore has now become one
of the richest countries in the world. In 2018, its GDP per capita in nominal
terms was US$64,582,163 ranking the seventh among world countries and the
third in real terms. Most importantly, since its separation from Malaysia in
1965, Singapore maintains a “soft authoritarianism” regime in political
terms164 while adopting government ownership extensively in economic
terms. Singapore’s marvelous economic achievement accompanied by the
government-led development model is appealing to many developing
countries, including China.165
Singapore’s development model is based on a “two-legged” policy that
relies on multinational corporations (“MNCs”) and government-linked
corporations (“GLCs”) for industrialization. Here I focus on the second
leg.166 The Singaporean government adopted the famous “Temasek model”
to manage large GLCs to spearhead development. The Temasek model
possesses two major characteristics. First, the Singaporean government has
a noticeable presence in the economy through GLCs (i.e., entities in which a
holding company wholly-owned by the Singaporean government has an
equity interest of 20 percent or more). To manage these GLCs, the
Singaporean government created many state holding companies. Among
161. World Bank Open Data, GDP – Singapore, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.
GDP.MKTP.CD?end=1995&locations=SG&start=1960 (last visited Aug. 18, 2019).
162. Id.
163. World Bank Open Data, GDP per capita – Singapore, http://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2018&locations=SG&start=1960 (last visited Aug.
18, 2019).
164. Marco Verweji & Riccardo Pelizzo, Singapore: Does Authoritarianism Pay?, 20:2
J. DEMOCRACY 18, 18-19 (2009).
165. Much China-study literature proposes that China may consider following
Singapore’s development model. For a summary, see Cheng-Han Tan et al., State-owned
Enterprises in Singapore: Historical Insights into a Potential Model for Reform, 28:2 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L. 61, 62-63 (2015).
166. The first leg, i.e., MNCs, is a distinguishing feature of Singapore’s model as opposed
to other East Asian developmental states. Instead of pursuing protectionism to develop
domestic industries, Singapore depended heavily on foreign direct investment to push for
Singapore’s economic development. In the process of attracting foreign investment, the
Singaporean government played a crucial role, ranging from regulating labor wages to create
attractive labor environment, awarding tax incentives to reduce investment cost, establishing
government-forced savings (i.e., the Central Provident Fund “CPF”) to finance infrastructure
development, to subsidizing foreign investors, etc. For a discussion, see Wolf, supra note 160,
at 1424-30. With these efforts, Singapore creates one of the best doing business environment
for foreign direct investment to contribute to Singapore’s economic development.
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them, Temasek Holdings, which is wholly owned by the Singaporean
Ministry of Finance, is the largest one.167 Through these GLCs, especially
through its control over the personnel of GLCs, the Singaporean government
ensures its control of strategically important industries.168 Second, despite
its ownership and control, the Singaporean government interferes in these
GLCs only minimally to allow them to run on commercial principles. In
general, the corporate governance of Temasek and all GLCs is quite
profession-oriented.169 Moreover, Temasek only proposes broad strategies
to its GLCs, leaving most of the managerial affairs to the company’s
management instead of the board of directors.170 The appraisal and
compensation of the appointed civil servants are also based on standards of
the private sector.171 Under this government-owned-professionally-managed
system, GLCs play an important role in Singapore’s economy.172

167. Temasek is one of the two major sovereign wealth funds managed by the
Singaporean government (the other one is Government of Singapore Investment Company
Private Limited (“GIC”)). Temasek holds subsidiaries in a wide range of industries, including
transportation, logistics, shipment, engineering, telecommunications, manufacturing,
properties, power, and finance, amounting to an estimated US$180 billion portfolio
investment. Christopher Chen, Solving the Puzzle of Corporate Governance of State-Owned
Enterprises: The Path of the Temasek Model in Singapore and Lessons for China, 36:2 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 303, 313 (2016). For a more detailed description of Temasek’s investment
portfolio, see Chen, supra note 167, at 326-31. For a discussion of the business of Temasek,
see Lai Si Tsui-Auch, Singaporean Business Groups: The Role of the State and Capital in
Singapore, Inc., in BUSINESS GROUPS IN EAST ASIA: FINANCIAL CRISIS, RESTRUCTURING, AND
NEW GROWTH 94 (Sea-Jin Chang ed., 2006).
168. For instance, it is documented that Temasek prefers to appoint former politicians,
civil servants, and high-ranking military officials to positions as chairmen, directors, and
senior management in the GLCs. Tsui-Auch, id. at 104. Although GLCs also recruits outside
management talent, the Singaporean government maintains its control of GLCs through this
“closely-knit political elite.” Tsui-Auch, id. at 105-06. It is also noted that after the Asian
Financial Crisis Temasek has appointed even more former officials in GLCs. Linda Low,
Rethinking Singapore Inc. and GLCs, SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS 282, 289 (2002).
169. For instance, all of Temasek’s directors have considerable business experience in
Singapore. Although Temasek appoints former civil servants on GLCs’ boards, these
appointees only serve a monitoring role. Tan et al., supra note 165, at 88-90. To be sure, some
level of political intervention remains inevitable. For instance, it is reported that Temasek’s
decisions have sometimes been made in close consultation with the government. Temasek’s
CEO Madam Ho Ching is the wife of Singapore’s current Prime Minister Lee Hsien-Loong,
the eldest son of Lee Kuan-Yew.
170. Tan et al., id. at 88-90.
171. Tsui-Auch, supra note 167, at 104.
172. It is estimated that GLCs accounted for around 37 percent of the total stock market
capitalization among Singapore’s listed companies in the 2010s. Tan et al., supra note 165, at
67.

4 - Yang_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete)

Summer 2020]

Should the Proud Dragon Repent?

4/24/2020 2:38 PM

295

Singapore’s banking system is also part of the Temasek system. After
a wave of bank consolidation after the Asian Financial Crisis, the current
banking market in Singapore consists of three main banking groups: the
Development Bank of Singapore (“DBS,” accounting for 39.63 percent of
market share), the United Overseas Bank (“UOB,” accounting for 29.38
percent of market share) and the Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation
(“OCBC,” accounting for 27.81 percent of market share), which altogether
dominated 97 percent of market share in Singapore in 2011.173 They are not
only the largest three banking groups in Singapore but also the largest three
business groups among all Singaporean businesses.174 Among them, DBS is
owned by the Singaporean government through the Temasek. As of 2018,
Temasek, directly and indirectly, owned at least 29.93 percent of DBS’s
shares,175 which allowed the Singaporean government to influence around
40 percent share of Singapore’s banking market.176 The Singaporean
government also borrows the practice of “amakudari (descent from heaven)”
from Japan to increase its influence. Several former and current ministers
and top civil servants have served as chairpersons and directors in these
private banks,177 which facilitates the communication between the
government and banks.
The extensive government ownership of corporations and banks does
not appear to compromise the economic efficiency of Singapore’s industries.
Empirical studies found that Singapore’s GLCs perform better than private
companies: their ROA and ROE are superior, their market valuation is
higher, and they are also better at managing expenses.178 GLCs also appear
to maintain better corporate governance practice, such as retaining more
outside directors and independent directors.179 In the banking sector, the
government’s ownership also contributes significantly to Singapore’s
173. SHEN CHUN-HUA (沈中華) & WANG LEE-RONG (王儷容), THE KEY FOR TAIWANESE
BANKING INDUSTRIES TO GO GLOBAL: COMPARATIVE ANALYSES WITH SINGAPORE AND
AUSTRALIA (台灣銀行業走向全球關鍵：與星澳之比較分析) 103-04 (2014).
174. Tsui-Auch, supra note 167, at 96-98.
175. DBS, ANNUAL REPORT OF 2018 210-11 (2019).
176. Despite the government’s ownership of DBS, it is reported that the Singaporean
government does not appear to interfere with the management of DBS or force it to extend
policy credits. Chen, supra note 167, at 352-53.
177. Tsui-Auch, supra note 167, at 102.
178. For a summary of these empirical studies, see Tan et al., supra note 165, at 67-69.
179. For instance, compared with family business groups, GLCs retain more outside
managers after the Asian Financial Crisis. Tsui-Auch, supra note 167, at 107-10. Besides,
Temasek is a strong advocate of independent directors after the Asian Financial Crisis, and
GLCs retain more independent directors than non-GLCs. Tan et al., id. at 90-91; Chen, supra
note 167, at 339-47.
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industrialization. Lee Kuan-Yew, the founding father of Singapore, used to
publicly praise DBS that it “helped finance entrepreneurs who needed
venture capital because [the] established banks had no experience outside
trade financing and were too conservative and reluctant to lend to would-be
manufacturers.”180
Observers often attribute Singapore’s success in maintaining an
efficient GLCs system to its unique political background. Singapore is a soft
authoritarianism regime ruled by a single party, i.e., the People’s Action
Party (“PAP”), for more than five decades. To win the popular support to
sustain its ruling legitimacy, PAP is compelled to deliver good lives to
Singaporeans; thus, it is incentivized to provide good economic management
to improve Singapore’s economy.181 This urges the Singaporean government
to manage GLCs efficiently from time to time.182
The case of Singapore illustrates that an authoritarian regime holding
extensive ownership of the banking sector can still pursue economic
efficiency and create economic success.
C. Summary: A Relative Theory of Private versus Public Sectors
In sum, many East Asian economies achieved their economic growth
while maintaining a government-dominated banking system. To be sure, I
do not raise these cases to argue that the government-dominated banking
model is superior. As will be discussed in the next section, many East Asian
economies went into financial crises in the 1990s, which suggested the limits
of this model. That said, these cases, together with China,183 present the first
half of a relative theory that justifies the government’s control of banking
sectors.
Private sectors and public sectors possess their relative strength and
weakness in developing an economy. On the one hand, private sectors
180. Tan et al., id. at 81.
181. Id. at 69, 85-87. For instance, to deliver good economic management, PAP was
forced to prioritize free-market principles and encourage foreign investment. Ashish Lall &
Ming-Hua Liu, Liberalization of Financial and Capital Markets – Singapore is Almost There,
28 L. & POL’Y IN INT’L BUS. 619, 619-21 (1997). For an introduction to the economic and
political background of PAP’s ruling of Singapore in the 1960s, see Tan et al., id. at 69-77.
182. For instance, after the Asian Financial Crisis, to diversify the risk exposure to
weather the economic downturn, Singapore responded quickly by initiating a going global
policy which aimed to bring Singapore’s economy beyond the region of Southeast Asia. TsuiAuch, supra note 167, at 94. For more discussion, see Chong, supra note 160. In the process,
the Singaporean government and GLCs played crucial roles in investing abroad, resulting in
an interesting phenomenon of “statist globalization.” See Chong, supra note 160, at 955-69.
183. For studies finding that China is similarly a developmental state, see Andrzej Bolesta,
China as a Developmental State, 5 MONTENEGRIN J. ECON. 106 (2007).

4 - Yang_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete)

Summer 2020]

4/24/2020 2:38 PM

Should the Proud Dragon Repent?

297

pursue business interests based on their cost and benefit calculation, which
makes them more operationally efficient. Several market failures, however,
may prevent them from acting developmental. For instance, they could be
short-termist and thus less inclined to invest in long-term projects that are
development-promoting. In addition, they may incur collective action
problems which prevent them from coordinating into a grander development
project.184 In light of the limits of private sectors, public sectors can perform
better in kick-starting an economy’s growth at its initial stage of
development. Specifically, through the government’s coordination, public
sectors are more likely to mobilize related resources and concentrate on a
single strategically important industry, which, in turn, employs scale of
economy to formulate a complete industry eco-system. Some studies of
development economics have documented that even those most neo-liberal
economies (such as United Kingdom, United States, or Hong Kong) had a
period of state protection and support of their financial markets before their
financial markets developed.185
IV. The Transition of East Asian Developmental States
By far, the proposed relative theory seems supporting China’s
development theory. The relative theory, however, is less optimistic of the
sustainability of a banking sector dominated by a party-state. The relative
theory takes into account the dynamism in the course of an economy’s
development and thus contains a temporal element. It predicts that, as an
economy develops and the private sectors mature, the relative efficiency of
the state sector vis-à-vis the private sector in developing an economy might
reverse. The state’s control of the banking sector would thus become
increasingly inefficient. For example, the state’s allocation of funds might
become less efficient than the market’s, which results in more bad loans and
less support of productive sectors. At a critical point, the state needs to
readjust its role in the banking sector.
The experience of East Asian developmental states again illustrates in
what circumstances and in what ways would a state-dominated banking
system evolve toward a more market-oriented model as the economy grows.
All these economies encountered challenges in the 1990s and thus adjusted
the state’s role in their banking systems. That said, due to the different

184. For a related discussion, see Randall Morck, Finance and Governance in Developing
Economies 3 ANNUAL REV. FIN. ECON. 375 (2011).
185. See, e.g., Svetlana Andrianova et al., Political Economy Origins of Financial
Markets in Europe and Asia, 39:5 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 686 (2011).
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background and institutions, each economy adopted different approaches of
adjustment, which offers a variety of transition models.
A. The Adjustment of the State’s Role in East Asian
Developmental States
1. Japan: An Economy-driven Evolution Featuring Regulatory Reforms
Although Japan maintained a milder degree of governmental
intervention in its banking system, it ran into troubles in the 1990s. In 1994,
two urban credit cooperatives, Tokyo Kyowa and Anzen, collapsed and
opened the banking crisis in Japan.186 The crisis then spread to large city
banks: Hokkaido Takushoku Bank collapsed in 1997. It also spread to longterm credit banks: Long-term Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon Credit Bank,
went nearly insolvent and were nationalized respectively in 1998 and
1999.187 Between 1994 and 2003, 171 Japanese banks failed, including one
city bank, two long-term credit banks, one regional bank, 12 second regional
banks, 23 shinkin banks, and 132 credit cooperatives.188
The causes of the banking crisis in Japan were many. The most
proximate one was the asset bubble in the stock market and real estate market
in the late 1980s and the burst of the bubble in the 1990s.189 Compared with
their respective price in 1985, the price of the stock market at its peak in
1989 and the price of the urban real estate market at its peak in 1991 almost
tripled. In 2000, however, this growth had dissipated.190 Many causes could
explain the rise and burst of the asset bubble, such as financial liberalization
in the 1980s, easier monetary conditions following the Plaza Agreement in
1985, the overconfidence in the prospective of Japan’s economy, poor credit
risk management by banks, and weak prudential regulation.191 The burst of
the asset bubble also resulted in a serious economic recession in Japan. From
1992 to 2002, known as the “Lost Decade,” Japan’s annual GDP growth rate

186. Hirofumi Uchida & Gregory Udell, Banking in Japan, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
BANKING 873, 899 (Allen N. Berger et al., eds., 2014).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Edward J Lincoln, Japan: Ongoing Financial Deregulation, Structural Change, and
Performance, 1990–2010, in HOW FINANCE IS SHAPING THE ECONOMIES OF CHINA, JAPAN,
AND KOREA 143, 149 (Yung Chul Park & Hugh Patrick eds., 2013).
190. Id. at 149-50.
191. Wataru Takahashi, The Japanese Financial Sector’s Transition from High Growth
to the “Lost Decades”, in EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM: DIVERSITY, CONTINUITY, AND CHANGE
201, 213 (Andrew Walter & Xiaoke Zhang eds., 2012). For a summary of the causes of the
banking crisis in Japan, see Uchida & Udell, supra note 186, at 901-02.
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was only 0.8 percent on average.192 The economic stagnation turned the
attention of Japanese reformers to the inefficiency of Japan’s financial
system.
Against this background, banking reforms taken by Japan since the late
1990s were mainly regulatory, known as the “Big Bang” reform.193 Part of
the Big Bang reform aimed at establishing a modern banking supervisory
structure to address the banking crisis. Japan established the Financial
Services Agency (“FSA”) in 1998 to assume the financial supervisory
authority from the Ministry of Finance.194 To combat NPLs in the banking
system, FSA required banks to write off their bad loans in the 2000s, which
shrank the NPLs of Japanese banks from 43.2 trillion yen in 2002 to 12.0
trillion yen in 2007.195 To establish minimum protection against capital risks,
FSA introduced the Basel capital rules to regulate the capital adequacy of
Japanese banks. These reforms built a more prudent regulatory environment
for Japan’s banking sectors.
On the other hand, part of the Big Bang reform aimed at deregulating
the financial sector to enhance the financial efficiency in supporting the
economy. For instance, by permitting the incorporation of financial holding
companies in 1997, Japan liberalized the long separation of banks from
securities firms, which led to the combination of fifteen large banks and other
financial institutions into four major financial holdings.196
The Big Bang reform also tackled the Japanese government’s
intervention in the banking system.197 FILP and postal savings were the
principal targets. Reformers criticized the politically-motivated allocation
of funds made by FILP and postal savings and argued that these
mismanagements led to excessive public works which caused the asset
bubble.198 To mitigate the governmental intervention, reformers firstly
established the Postal Savings Agency in 2001 to take charge of postal
192. World Bank Open Data, GDP – Japan, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.
GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2002&locations=JP&start=1992 (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).
193. For a summary of the Big Bang reform during this period, see Lincoln, supra note
189, at 184. For a brief introduction to the evolution of the banking system in Japan, see
Takahashi, id.
194. For a brief introduction to why the Ministry of Finance’s power was deprived, see
Lincoln, id. at 180-83.
195. Id. at 155.
196. Id. at 156.
197. For a summary of the reforms targeting at government financial intermediation, see
id. at 185-90.
198. It was found that the Liberal Democratic Party, the ruling party in Japan then, used
loans from government banks for political purposes, such as their recommended electoral
candidates who were electorally vulnerable or senior. See generally Imai, supra note 99.
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savings services.199
The reform further ensured the operational
independence of the Postal Savings Agency by allowing it to invest its fund
without turning over to the Ministry of Finance. In 2003, the Postal Savings
Agency was corporatized into the Japan Post, a government-owned
company. In 2006, insisted by Premier Junichiro Koizumi, the Japan Post
drafted a long-term privatization plan, under which it would: first, transform
into a holding company holding all the shares of the savings bank; and
second, sell two-thirds of the shares of the savings bank to private investors
on a progressive basis throughout 2010-2017.200 The first part of the plan
was realized in 2007: the Japan Post, a government-wholly-owned holding
company, incorporated the Japan Post Bank and Japan Post Life Insurance
to conduct postal savings businesses and life insurance businesses
respectively. Today, the Japan Post Bank is the single largest depository
institution in Japan.201 The second part of the plan has also been on its way.
In 2015, Japan’s Ministry of Finance initiated a “triple-head” IPO plan, in
which it sold 11 percent shares of the Japan Post, Japan Post Bank, and Japan
Post Life to the public.202 In addition to the privatization of Japan Post, other
government financial institutions experienced significant changes as well.203
These reforms “paved the way for a smaller role of government in mediating
financial flows.”204
In sum, Japan’s banking reform was mainly a response to the banking
crisis and economic recession in the 1990s. Japan reduced the government’s
intervention in the banking system by adjusting the government’s role from
a guider, which frequently issued administrative guidance without legal
basis, to a regulator, which supervised banks based on banking laws and
regulations. The case of Japan suggests that excessive governmental
intervention in the banking system could result in excessive infrastructure

199. Uchida & Udell, supra note 186, at 886-87.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Atsuko Fukase, Japan Post Prepares to Deliver $12 Billion IPO, WALL ST. J., Nov.
2, 2015.
203. For instance, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi also pushed forward the
privatization of JDB, which led to the corporatization of JDB into a government whollyowned company subject to future rounds of shares privatization. Several government financial
institutions also merged into a single government organization, the Japan Finance
Corporation, in 2008.
204. Lincoln, supra note 189, at 189. After these reforms, the current financial and
banking system in Japan presents a different picture, but only in a modest degree. For instance,
although equity finance increases, Japan remains a bank-led system. The misallocation of
funds appears to continue: corporate sectors remain investing excessively, which leads to low
ROE and ROA. Lincoln, id. at 217-18.
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investment, which, in turn, result in an asset bubble. As China’s real estate
price continued to soar, China should closely watch if it has proceeded into
this critical intersection.
a.2.South Korea: A Crisis-driven Evolution Featuring Privatization
In South Korea, its government- and chaebol-driven model also came
with a price. In contrast with Japan, South Korea had a strong governmentdominated banking system during the fast-growth period. Under this
government-dominated banking system, banks were less incentivized to
establish their risk assessment capabilities.205 The government’s focused
support of chaebols to pursue economies of scale thus resulted in hugely
leveraged chaebols,206 serious NPL problems in the banking system,207 and
low profitability of banks.208 These problems forced the South Korean
government to commence a series of financial liberalization and bank
privatization in the 1980s, but these reforms were in general “cosmetic” as
mentioned above.209 The government continued controlling the management
of privatized banks and dictating their lending decisions, which maintained
the government-dominated banking system in South Korea.
The first real challenge to this government-dominated banking system
took place in 1993 when President Kim Yong-Sam took his office. President
Kim, as the first civilian president, shifted the national policy of South Korea
from a development-oriented one to a globalization-oriented one.210 He
abandoned industrial policies by merging the Economic Planning Board to
the Ministry of Finance and Economy, which symbolized the demise of
planning in South Korea.211 In addition, to apply for the OECD membership
205. Kiseok Hong & Jong-Wha Lee, Korea: Returning to Sustainable Growth?, in THE
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: LESSONS FOR A RESILIENT ASIA 203, 207-08 (Wing Thye Woo et al.
eds., 2000).
206. The ratio of debt to equity in the 50 largest chaebols was at least 524 percent in 1980
and 454.8 percent in 1985. Moreover, seven of them had a debt ratio over 1,000 percent: The
highest one reached 47,699 percent. WOO, supra note 109, at 170.
207. The NPL ratio in the banking sector reached 13.7 percent in 1983 and 17 percent in
1985. WOO, supra note 109, at 170.
208. The ROA of South Korean banks was 0.56 percent on average from 1990 to 1993
and 0.26 percent in 1996. Noble & Ravenhill, supra note 126, at 93.
209. Yung Chul Park, Financial Development and Liberalization in Korea 1980–2011, in
HOW FINANCE IS SHAPING THE ECONOMIES OF CHINA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 225, 227 (Hugh
Patrick & Yung Chul Park eds., 2013).
210. Haeran Lim, Democratization and the Transformation Process in East Asian
Developmental States: Financial Reform in Korea and Taiwan, 33:1 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 75,
87 (2009).
211. Id.
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in 1993, President Kim placed financial liberalization as his priority
reforms.212 Specifically, he relaxed and gradually phased out capital account
regulations.213 The liberalization largely enhanced chaebols’ financial
autonomy while reducing the government’s control of the credits to
chaebols, which shifted South Korea’s development model from a
government-centered one to a chaebol-centered one.214
The banking system in South Korea, however, went into troubles in
1997 when the Asian Financial Crisis hit South Korea. In South Korea, the
financial crisis primarily resulted from the financial liberalization in the
1990s.215 Due to the deregulation of capital flows, South Korean banks,
financial institutions, and large businesses had greater access to cheaper
foreign credits, which resulted in a spike of capital inflows from 1994 to
1996.216 These foreign credits were, however, mainly short-term ones,217
which flowed via the non-bank financial intermediaries (“NBFIs”)
controlled by chaebols to the long-term investment projects of chaebols.218
This resulted in maturity mismatch which rendered South Korea’s economy
vulnerable to runs of short-term foreign credits. In the 1990s, when South
Korea’s trade performance turned bad due to Japanese yen’s depreciation,
the vulnerability of South Korea’s banking system finally floated to the
surface. Foreign investors began to lose confidence in the South Korean
economy and run. This made the rollover of short-term foreign loans less
available, which bankrupted several smaller chaebols.219 At the same time,
as financial conditions of chaebols deteriorated, NPLs of South Korean
banks spiked, which eventually resulted in the insolvency of many banks.220
As foreign investors withdrew their short-term funding, the foreign reserve
held by the Bank of Korea dropped rapidly. This resulted in the downward
adjustment of South Korea’s sovereign ratings, which made South Korea
212. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 225.
213. Park, supra note 209, at 227-28.
214. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 224-27. See also Noble & Ravenhill, supra
note 126, at 82-83.
215. Hong & Lee, supra note 205, at 208.
216. Foreign capital inflow increased from 30 percent of South Korea’s GDP in 1994 to
47 percent in 1996.
217. In 1996, it was estimated that nearly 60% of credit in South Korea was short-term
with a maturity of less than one year. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 226-27.
218. This provided “a seemingly unlimited credit supply” that “further pushed the chaebol
into their high-flying and high-risk investment plans.” Id. at 226.
219. The failure of chaebols started from Hanbo, the fourteenth largest conglomerate in
South Korea, in January 1997, followed by smaller ones such as Sammi, Jinro and Dainong,
then the Kia Motors, one of the three largest auto companies in South Korea.
220. Park, supra note 209, at 251.
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even more difficult to roll over its short-term foreign borrowings. On
November 19, 1997, the foreign reserve of South Korea finally depleted; the
government had no choice but to seek assistance from the IMF.221
To obtain the IMF’s assistance, South Korea accepted the conditionality
imposed by the IMF. In the IMF’s view, the flight of foreign capital from
South Korea resulted from investors’ loss of confidence in South Korea. To
restore it, South Korea needed investor-friendly policies to attract them
back.222 Accordingly, IMF proposed a set of recipes containing large-scale
financial deregulation and liberalization, including the deregulation of
interest rates, free-floating exchange rates, the improvement of risk
management and corporate governance of financial institutions, the revamp
of the financial market infrastructure, and the establishment of an
independent and unified financial regulatory agency.223
Financial liberalization, however, was not the major rescuer of South
Korea’s banking system.224 Foreign investors did not come back to South
Korea, at least not immediately, after South Korea liberalized its financial
sector.225 Instead, it was the government’s massive intervention that saved
South Korea’s economy. To rescue the dying banking system, the South
Korean government took several measures.226 First, it guaranteed all
deposits by establishing the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (“KDIC”)
in 1996 to introduce deposit insurance to protect depositors of banking and
non-banking institutions.227 Second, to rescue and recapitalize insolvent
banks, the government nationalized eight commercial banks in this period,
which increased the government ownership in the banking sector from 33

221. For a brief account of the events leading to the 1997 financial crisis in South Korea,
see Park, supra note 209, at 246-51; Hong & Lee, supra note 205, at 206-10. For a discussion
of the political factors leading to the outbreak of the financial crisis in South Korea, see
Stephan Haggard & Andrew MacIntyre, The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis:
Korea and Thailand Compared, in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF
GLOBAL FINANCE supra note 126, at 57, 69-76.
222. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 228.
223. Park, supra note 209, at 286. Other measures included abolishing the ceilings on
foreign shareholdings of a South Korean company, admitting foreign hostile takeovers,
permitting foreign directors in financial institutions, etc. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132,
at 228.
224. See generally Kalinowsky & Cho, id.
225. It was reported that between 1997 and 2000, net foreign capital inflow only
accounted for 5 percent of South Korea’s currency reserve increases. Id. at 230.
226. For a brief account, see Mayung-Koo Kang, The Sequence and Consequences of
Bank Restructuring in South Korea, 1998-2006 – Too Fast to Adjust, 49 ASIAN SURVEY 243,
246-55 (2009).
227. Kang, supra note 226, at 247.

4 - Yang_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete)

304

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

4/24/2020 2:38 PM

[Vol. 43:2

percent in 1996 to 54 percent in 2000.228 To finance the nationalization, the
government issued Deposit Insurance Fund Bond (a government-guaranteed
bond issued by KDIC) in an amount equivalent to 28 percent of South
Korea’s GDP in 2000, which was “one of the most expensive in recent
history.”229 Third, the government restructured NPLs. It firstly closed nonviable banks or consolidated them with viable ones, which significantly
concentrated the banking sector in South Korea.230 It then refinanced those
viable ones by establishing the Korea Asset Management Corporation
(“KAMCO”) to acquire their NPLs.231 Between 1998 and 2000, KAMCO
resolved more than 45 percent of the total NPLs.232 These measures
significantly restructured South Korean banks. Only after the South Korean
government cleaned up the mess did foreign investors return.
After foreign investors returned, the South Korean government began
to sell its ownership of South Korean banks to foreign investors. The South
Korean government promised to IMF that the nationalization of South
Korean banks was meant to be temporary. Domestic capital, however, was
inadequate to acquire the government’s ownership. The government thus
turned to foreign investors.233 Foreign ownership of South Korean banks
accordingly skyrocketed. By 2005, among the seven biggest commercial
banks in South Korea, six of them were majority-owned by foreign
investors.234 In 2006, foreign investors held 65 percent of the ownership in
the entire commercial banking sector; in 1998 this figure was only 18
percent.235 By 2011, among the largest four commercial banks in South
Korea, i.e. Kookmin, Shinhan, Woori, and Hana, foreign ownership became
dominant, ranging from 67 percent in Hana to 22 percent in Woori.236 In

228. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 230.
229. Id. at 231.
230. After series of closure and consolidation, the number of banks was reduced to 7
nationwide commercial banks and 5 regional banks by 2007, with the four largest banks (i.e.,
Kookmin, Shinhan, Woori, and Hana) accounting for more than 70 percent of bank assets in
2010. Park, supra note 209, at 238.
231. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 231-33.
232. Kang, supra note 226, at 251. For an account of the process adopted by KAMCO to
acquire and resolve these NPLs, see Kang, id. at 251-55.
233. Chaebol perhaps had enough capital to buy out these banks, but this was politically
inviable. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 233. For further discussion of the rationale
behind the swift sales to foreign investors, see Kang, id. at 262-65; Lim, supra note 210, at
90-95.
234. Lim, supra note 210, at 89-90.
235. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 234.
236. Park, supra note 209, at 244.
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sum, after the Asian Financial Crisis, foreign capitals replaced the
government and became the major owner of South Korea’s banking sector.237
The impact of these crisis-driven and IMF-guided reforms is profound
for South Korea’s economy. After privatizing banks to foreign capitals, the
government’s ownership largely shrank. Financial liberalization further
compromised South Korean banks’ support for investment. For instance,
loans to corporate sectors dropped sharply while bank funds increasingly
flowed to household and mortgage loans, which contributed to the credit card
crisis in 2003 and the mortgage crisis in 2005-2008.238 Most importantly,
they dismantled the developmental state in South Korea, in particular, the
collusive arrangement among the government, chaebols, and banks.239 The
government’s reduced ownership of South Korean banks compromised its
ability to implement industrial policies; it accordingly had to turn to other
fiscal measures, such as subsidies, to fund industrial policies.240
In sum, South Korea’s large-scale banking reform was a product of
democratic transition, change of political leader, and financial crisis. South
Korea’s presidential election in 1997 for the first time elected the dissident
Kim Dae Jung as the president, who was long against the authoritarian and
chaebol-led economy. The financial crisis allowed him to introduce IMF and
foreign investors to counterbalance the vested interests led by chaebol.
Chaebol’s excessive expansion and poor risk management, which eventually
led to the financial crisis, also discredited chaebol and weakened their
political legitimacy. Only under this political setting did the reduction of the
government’s role and financial liberalization become politically feasible in
South Korea.241 Moreover, South Korea’s case also suggests that an
economy needs to be cautious before liberalizing its capital account.
Specifically, before liberalizing its financial sectors, an efficient and
independent system of financial regulation must be in place.242 A “wrongly

237. Despite their large ownership in aggregate, they do not control the management of
South Korean banks. Park, supra note 209, at 244-45.
238. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 239-40. See also Kang, supra note 226, at
244-45, 258-60.
239. Park, supra note 209, at 286.
240. Karl J. Fields, Not of a Piece: Developmental States, Industrial Policy and Evolving
Patterns of Capitalism in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, in EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM: DIVERSITY,
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 46, 54-56 (Andrew Walter & Xiaoke Zhang eds., 2012).
241. For an account of the political economy behind the post-financial-crisis reform in
South Korea, see id. at 234-37.
242. Park, supra note 209, at 292-93 (highlighting that this includes an efficient system
of both micro- and macro-prudential regulations and a regime of capital controls and foreign
exchange market interventions to better counter the high degree of capital movements,
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sequenced liberalization,” which partially withdrew the government’s
control of capital flows without necessary supervisory measures, may be
fatal.243
b.Taiwan: A Politics-driven Evolution Featuring Market Entry
In the course of Taiwan’s development, the Taiwanese government also
reduced its intervention in the banking system, though at a less significant
level. Different from South Korea, Taiwan was not hit seriously by the Asian
Financial Crisis.244 Therefore, the Taiwanese government never had to
privatize its SBs to rescue its banking system245 and thus manages to
dominate Taiwan’s banking system even until today. The driving force that
modernized Taiwan’s banking system was politics instead of the financial
crisis.246
Taiwan’s banking system encountered drastic changes in the 1990s.247
Before 1991, there were only 10 commercial banks and 12 specialized banks
in Taiwan; among them, the Taiwanese government owned all of them except
for four commercial banks.248 In 1991 and 1992, however, the “Big Bang”
hit. Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance approved the incorporation of sixteen

together with access to short-term reserve-currency liquidity through participation in
international cooperative arrangements to prepare for an unexpected reversal in capital flow.)
243. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 227.
244. This relative soundness may be attributed to the conservative banking regulation and
supervision as well as the slow pace of financial liberalization in Taiwan. Lim, supra note
210, at 98-99.
245. To be sure, Taiwan still ran into local financial crisis in the 1990s. Since 1995,
Taiwan witnessed explosive runs in its primary financial institutions: between 1995 and 1997
10 credit cooperatives and 27 credit departments of agricultural associations encountered
runs, which forced the Taiwanese government to launch the first round of financial reforms
to combat these problems. LAI, supra note 150, at 89-90, 96-98. The scale, however, was not
comparable with that in South Korea during the same period.
246. For a discussion of how Taiwan’s financial system allowed it to escape from the
Asian Financial Crisis but later on precluded it from large-scale financial reforms, see
generally Lim, supra note 210.
247. Before the 1990s, the Taiwanese government sporadically opened the banking
system to private financial institutions, in particular to foreign banks, overseas Chinese
capitals, etc., but this openness was mostly strategic and small-scale. LIN, supra note 150, at
35-41. Financial liberalization and bank privatization, which already took place in South
Korea in the 1980s, did not happen in Taiwan in that period. And one reason why Taiwan did
not follow South Korea in denationalizing the banks during the 1980s was that Sun Yat-Sen’s
philosophy regards banks as prime candidates for tight public control. WADE, supra note 140,
at 261.
248. LAI, supra note 150, at 60-62; see also Yang, supra note 151, at 298.
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private banks in two years,249 which significantly changed the landscape.
After more than two decades of growth and consolidation, today these
private banks have acquired equal market share with SBs.250 The entry of
these new private banks, coupled with the interest rate liberalization which
was already on the way, aggravated the interest rate competition in Taiwan’s
banking market. As a result, loan rates declined while deposit rates
increased, which benefited both borrowers and depositors.251 Credit card and
car loans also became more common, which benefited public consumers.252
In these aspects, the entry of private banks indeed intensified market
competition and improved the efficiency of Taiwan’s banking industry.
Taiwan’s move toward this competition-based reform can be explained
by at least two accounts: an economic one and a political one. Economically,
such reform responded to the financial inefficiency of SBs. Taiwan’s
primary financial institutions incurred some turbulence in the 1980s.253 In
addition, as the economy went up, excess money flooded into fund markets
through a variety of channels, including illegal underground investment
companies, which resulted in the stock market and real estate booms (or
bubble). As a response, the Taiwanese government initiated banking reforms
in 1989 to regulate illegal underground finance. Liberalizing the private
entry into the banking sector thus served as a way to introduce underground
finance into the formal banking system and subject it to the regulator’s
supervision.254
Politically, the political fragmentation and reconsolidation in Taiwan
during the mid-1980s weakened the power of the Taiwanese government and
reduced the government’s domination of the banking system.255 Specifically,
in 1988, the authoritarian President Chiang Ching-Kuo, the son of Chiang
Kai-Shek, passed away, leaving a power vacuum in KMT. After dramatic
debates between different factions of KMT, Lee Teng-Hui assumed the
president of Taiwan in the same year. Lee’s power within KMT, however,
was insecure because he was a local Taiwanese while KMT’s elders were
249. For a list of these new private banks incorporated in 1991-1992, see Yang, id. at 321.
250. In 1992, these new private banks only held 2.76 percent of deposits and 3.90 percent
of loans in Taiwan. Id. at 322.
251. Id. at 320-22.
252. Id. at 320-22.
253. In the 1980s, there were sporadic bank run cases, including the notorious Taipei City
Tenth Credit Cooperative case, the hugest bank failure case in Taiwan’s banking history.
These cases, however, only involved trust investment companies and local credit
cooperatives, which was relatively small in scale and did not pose systemic risks to the overall
banking system.
254. See Yang, supra note 151, at 293-94.
255. See WADE, supra note 140, at 289-94.
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mostly Mainlanders who could hardly respect Lee. To solidify his power
and defend against the opposition from KMT’s elders, Lee sought escorts
from local Taiwanese businessmen. In exchange for the political support and
loyalty from these locals, he released financial prerogative to them by
approving the entry of private businesses into the banking system. The fact
that fifteen of nineteen applicants managed to obtain approval of bank
incorporation in 1991 suggested the ingratiation of the government toward
local businesses.256 Although this rapid liberalization resulted in serious
over-banking problems in Taiwan,257 it managed to reduce the government’s
dominance of the banking system.
During the same period, the Taiwanese government also began to
privatize some SBs. The motives behind were many-fold.258 The first one
relates to the competitiveness of SBs. Taiwanese laws treated SBs as public
enterprises and obliged SBs to observe the budget, audits, personnel,
procurement, and business regulations that apply to governmental agencies.
They also treated bankers in SBs as public officials and applied public
official laws to regulate the hiring, evaluation, promotion, and retirement of
these bankers.259 SBs were further held accountable to several governmental
agencies, such as Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, Directorate-general of
Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Ministry of Examination, and Ministry of
Civil Services, etc., as well as congresspersons, which compromised their
operational autonomy.260 The entry of private banks into the market exposed
the inefficiency of SBs.261 Privatization thus became a way out. At the same
time, to expand infrastructure construction, the Taiwanese government also
faced fiscal problems. Privatizing SOEs became a way to raise finance to
balance the government’s budget.262 Hence, in 1998 and 1999, the
Taiwanese government privatized nine SBs, representing more than 35.39

256. LIN, supra note 150, at 70-72. Lin also observed the capital structure of these newly
approved banks and found that their capitals were from either industry, non-bank financial
institutions, businesses, or the KMT, which were all business groups with special political
connection.
257. Taiwan was considered the most over-banked market in Asia. Lim, supra note 210,
at 100.
258. See YU TZONG-SHIAN (于宗先) & WANG CHIN-LI (王金利), THE EVOLUTION
TAIWAN’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM (臺灣金融體制之演變) 209-212 (2005).
259. Id. at 223-25.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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percent of bank asset and 35.05 percent of bank loans in Taiwan.263 In
appearance, Taiwan achieved impressive progress in bank privatization.
These privatizations, however, were mostly cosmetic, and the
Taiwanese government never really relinquished its control. As mentioned
above, Taiwanese SBs were inefficient because they were treated as public
enterprises which are defined as enterprises whose 50 percent ownership or
more is held by the government. As long as the government reduced its
ownership to below 50 percent, the problems were solved and the Taiwanese
government did not need to relinquish its dominance over these privatized
banks. Accordingly, after the privatization, the Taiwanese government
remained the largest shareholder of these banks and dominated their
operation. Among the privatized banks, except for Taipei Bank, the majority
board members remained the government’s representatives.264 Hence,
despite some “privatization” cases, the Taiwanese government’s control over
these privatized banks did not fundamentally alter.
In the 2000s, when the opposition party Democratic Progressive Party
(“DPP”) for the first time won the presidential election and became the ruling
party in Taiwan, the pace of privatization mildly accelerated. In 2004,
President Chen Shui-Bian declared to launch the second round of financial
reforms, which included cutting the number of SBs by half by the end of
2005. Unfortunately, the new administration’s efforts largely went in vain
after the scandals of corruption broke out in 2006.265 Several senior officials,
including the president Chen Shui-Bian and the first lady Wu Shu-Chen,
were found receiving bribes from entrepreneurs on different occasions,
including in several consolidation transactions between financial
institutions. These scandals seriously discredited President Chen and DPP
and directly resulted in DPP’s loss of the 2008 presidential election. Due to
the serious political backfire, the new administration suspended the plans to
privatize SBs. Since then, no bank privatization ever took place in Taiwan.
In sum, Taiwan’s banking reform responded partly to the reduced
competitiveness of SBs and partly to the political reform and
democratization. The transition of Taiwan’s banking system corresponds
with the political reform and democratization in Taiwan during the same

263. Id.
264. See id. at 226-28. Taking First Financial Holdings for instance, as of 2016, the
Ministry of Finance, together with the government-owned Taiwan Bank, held 18.94 percent
of its issued shares, but the MOF and Taiwan Bank together appointed 9 of 12 directors of the
First Financial Holding, including the chairperson.
265. Other factors that obstructed bank privatization in Taiwan included the opposition
from labor unions and the over-pricing of the government’s shares. See Lim, supra note 210,
at 101-02.
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period, which indicated that the driving force behind was not only economics
but also politics.
c. Singapore:
Professionalization

A

Policy-driven

Evolution

Featuring

Similar to Taiwan, Singapore was less hit by the Asian Financial Crisis
and thus did not need to surrender its government-dominated banking
system. In addition, there are two major private banks in Singapore, UOB,
and OCBC, as well as several foreign banks which compete with Singapore’s
SBs (mainly the DBS). What makes Singapore’s model unique, however, is
the governance practice of Singapore’s SBs.
Although the Asian Financial Crisis did not result in a financial crisis in
Singapore, the economic slowdown caused by the regional crisis prompted
the Singaporean government to devote to enhancing the operational
efficiency of Singaporean firms. This led to three specific moves that
reduced the government’s impact, i.e., globalization, divestiture of business
lines, and professionalization of the management.266 First, in light of the
turbulence and economic slowdown in Southeast Asia, Singapore shifted the
focus of its industrial policies toward globalization to diversify its risk
exposure. In line with this policy, Singapore liberalized its financial sectors,
such as removing foreign shareholding limits and issuing new full bank
licenses to foreign banks.267 This introduced market competition and
reduced the influence of SBs. Second, to attract foreign acquisition, the
Singaporean government also started to divest its holdings in GLCs,
especially for non-core businesses which were “no longer strategic to
Singapore or when viable market alternatives or regulatory frameworks are
in place”268 Although the pace of privatization remains gradual and the
effects remain mixed, the government’s role in GLCs reduced. Finally and
most importantly, to enhance the operational efficiency of GLCs, the
Singaporean government professionalized the management of GLCs and
advocated independent directors. As a result, GLCs became more businessoriented and less government-dominated. In sum, the Asian Financial Crisis
and the globalization wave pressed Singapore’s developmental state model
to evolve toward a less-interventionist fashion.269

266. For a brief discussion, see Tsui-Auch, supra note 167, at 106-15.
267. Id. at 106. See also Chong, supra note 160, at 970-72.
268. Tsui-Auch, id. at 106-07.
269. Some commentators also argued that Singapore’s economy is not as splendid as most
observers perceive. See generally Verweji & Pelizzo, supra note 164.
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Similar reforms also took place in Singapore’s banking sector. After
the Asian Financial Crisis, the Singaporean government devoted to
improving the corporate governance of SBs and introducing professional
management. For instance, it required banks to establish nominating
committees to select and appoint board members and senior officers.270
Accordingly, SBs increasingly recruited professional managers from private
sectors. For instance, DBS retained the former JP Morgan banker as its CEO,
who led DBS to profits and recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis.271
Thanks to this government-owned-professionally-managed governance
model, also known as the Temasek model, Singapore’s SBs incurred fewer
corporate governance problems traditionally assigned to SBs. Instead, they
appear safe, sound, commercialized, professionalized, and globallycompetitive.
China is eager to borrow the experience of the Temasek model to reform
its SOEs.272 Many Chinese reformers believe that the Temasek model, which
introduces professional management to SOEs, can reasonably constrain the
government’s intervention in SOE operation. They argue that this model
illustrates that “a highly successful economy and system of corporate
governance can be built on a foundation of corporations that have the
government as their ultimate controlling shareholder.”273 On the other hand,
many commentators cautioned against China’s such over-optimism. Some
raised several complementary factors necessary for the success of the
Temasek model but absent in China, such as high-quality public governance
and contested democratic election in Singapore.274 Others attributed the
overall success of the Temasek model to Singapore’s tradition of employing
GLCs for pragmatic instead of ideological reasons275 and argued that China
270. Tsui-Auch, supra note 167, at 106.
271. Id. at 108.
272. Tan et al., supra note 165, at 62-63.
273. Id. at 64.
274. See id. at 93-94. See also Chen, supra note 167, at 362-65; Cheng Han Tan, The
Beijing Consensus and Possible Lessons from the “Singapore Model”?, 10-15 (NUS Centre
for Asian Legal Studies Working Paper, No. 2016/001, 2016). In particular, they emphasized
that political liberalization with open elections in Singapore plays an important role for the
PAP to detect the public’s reaction to its economic measures and fine-tune its economic
policies, including its use of GLCs, toward public goods. Tan, supra note 274, at 15-17. For
different opinion arguing that Singapore’s lack of true political democracy compromised its
economic achievement and resulted in domestic economic problems, see Verweji & Pelizzo,
supra note 164, at 29-31.
275. Specifically, Singapore established GLCs to address the market failure in Singapore,
in particular, the inadequate supply of industrial finance from local private bankers due to
their limited experience and ability. Since GLCs serve pragmatic purposes, the Singaporean
government well-recognized the pragmatic limits of SOEs, such as the inherent inefficiency;
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does not hold similar pragmatic attitude toward government ownership.276
In sum, absent complementary institutions, the Temasek model could be
incompatible with China’s situation.
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of these explanations, they
overlook a fundamental aspect. Temasek model is business- and professionoriented due to the direction of Singapore’s industrial policies instead of the
corporate governance structure. As mentioned above, the Singaporean
government sometimes exercised its influence in GLCs and DBS to support
its policies, such as providing industrial finance in the 1960s and 1970s and
supporting the going global policy after the Asian Financial Crisis.
Accordingly, the Temasek model does not preclude the Singaporean
government from intervening in SBs. The difference, however, is that the
Singaporean government exercises its influence in a business-oriented way.
This is because Singapore’s industrial policy is different. For other East
Asian developmental states, including China,277 their industrial policies
aimed at building domestic businesses and targeting specific industries for
development, which incur protectionism and domestic subsidies. For
Singapore, its industrial policies aim at attracting foreign investment and
becoming globally competitive,278 which require a global-market-oriented
and business-oriented mind. To pursue this different industrial policy, the
Singaporean government needs professional managements to operate GLCs
and SBs, which resulted in the Temasek model. In other words, the Temasek
model still invites governmental intervention, but the government intervenes
in a commercial way to attract foreign investment and go global Singaporean
businesses.
The Singaporean government adopted a foreign-investment-oriented
policy for a political reason. Historically, ‘PAP, Singapore’s ruling party, did
not want strong local businesses to challenge its power. Before the
independence of Singapore from Malaysia, local ethnic Chinese
businesspersons were the most powerful economic and political interest
group. Politically, they opposed PAP’s policies.279 Economically, they

thus it consciously evaluated GLCs based on their operational performance. Tan et al., supra
note 165, at 83-84. On the other hand, Singapore’s attitude toward free trade and free markets
is also pragmatic; see Wolf, supra note 160, at 1435.
276. Others pointed out that Temasek is incentivized to behave professionally and
business-oriented because its investments have operation substantially outside Singapore and
must abide by foreign laws. Chen, supra note 167, at 365-68.
277. BREMMER, supra note 16, at 138-41.
278. Wolf, supra note 160, at 1433-34.
279. Lee Kuan-Yew, PAP’s leader, himself was English educated and could not speak
Chinese well, who could hardly win the respect and support from the ethnic Chinese
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mainly engaged in export-import trade instead of manufacturing, which was
against PAP’s industrial policy that prioritized industrialization over exportimport trade. Accordingly, after Singapore was separated from Malaysia in
1963, PAP maintained a policy that alienated ethnic Chinese business
community. To bypass this powerful business community without harming
Singapore’s economic development, PAP embraced the two-legged policy
and turned to multinationals and GLCs.280 The Asian Financial Crisis did
not alter the above landscape much, except that it spurred the direction of
Singapore’s industrial policy toward investing globally. So long as
Singapore’s policy remains connected to global investment, the Temasek
model is a rational choice for the Singaporean government.
In sum, Singapore’s banking reform is a response to the shifting
industrial policies. The direction of an economy’s industrial policies can
affect the government’s intervention in the banking system. In Singapore’s
case, since its industrial policies concern foreign direct investment and
outbound investment, the government tends to exercise its dominance over
the banking system in a commercial fashion.
B. The Relative Theory Sequel
The transition experience of these four East Asian developmental states
completes the second half of the proposed relative theory. It demonstrates
the dynamism of economic development and the unsustainability of the
development theory. As an economy grows, the advantages of the state’s
domination of the banking sector (such as centralized mobilization of
investible funds) would gradually fade, while the disadvantages (such as
incautious lending and low operational efficiency) would become more
obvious. If the state fails to find a balance, a financial crisis or even an
economic crisis might occur. The case of Japan and South Korea vividly
evidenced this observation, but even Taiwan and Singapore reflected this
point. Moreover, the influence of economic development can extend to the
political sphere. As an economy develops, the political influence of private
sectors would also increase, which produces different chemistry in domestic
politics. The corresponding political transition would also impose pressure
on the government to readjust its role in the banking sector. South Korea
and Taiwan reflected this point. In sum, to move the economy forward, at

community. Tan et al., supra note 165, at 70; Wolf, id. at 1430-32. For more discussion of
why the ethnic Chinese businesspersons opposed PAP, see Low, supra note 160, at 417-18.
280. See Tsui-Auch, supra note 167, at 101-02. See also Tan et al., id. at 79-84; Low, id.
at 418.
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some point, a developmental state has to reduce its intervention in the
banking sector and let market function more.281
China also had a similar experience in the late 1990s that supported this
dynamism aspect. After the Chinese party-state widely used the four largest
SOCBs (the “Big Four”) to extend policy-based and political loans in the
1980s and 1990s, the Big Four’s average NPL ratio skyrocketed to 21.4
percent by the end of 1995.282 According to the official estimate, only 20
percent of NPLs resulted from the Big Four’s mismanagement of loans while
80 percent resulted from the Chinese government’s policy mandates.283 Due
to the rapid accumulation of NPLs, the Big Four’s average capital adequacy
ratio (“CAR”) dropped to only 3.3 percent.284 Technically speaking, China’s
banking sector was already bankrupt. To weather this local financial crisis,
the Chinese party-state launched a series of rescue measures, including
stripping off a huge amount of bad loans from the Big Four, capital
replenishment, introducing foreign strategic investors, and listing. In the
course of these reforms, the party-state repositioned its role in China’s
banking sector and introduced more foreign capital and private capital to
marketize the system. These moves were even praised by some
commentators as a model for governance reform of SBs.285 China’s such
relative success in SB transition evidences the unsustainability of the
development-oriented SB model. The transition will be necessary at some
point.
The chart below illustrates the complete story of the relative theory. The
horizontal axis reflects the development level of the economy. The right part
refers to a higher development level while the left part refers to a lower
development level. The vertical axis reflects the developmental efficiency
of a sector. The upper part refers to higher efficiency in supporting economic
development while the bottom part refers to lower efficiency. As the chart
exhibits, in the early development phase, the state sector might possess
relative efficiency over the private sector as the development theory predicts.
Nevertheless, as an economy develops and passes the critical intersection
point, the state sector would become less efficient as the property right theory
predicts. At that point, the state needs to either reduce its role in the banking

281. For an analysis of how the state capitalism cannot sustain for good, see BREMMER,
supra note 16, at 171-77.
282. LI ZHI-HUI, DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM OF CHINA’S BANKING SYSTEM 108 (2012).
283. LIU, supra note 69, at 72.
284. LI, supra note 282, at 108.
285. See generally Franklin Allen et al., The IPO of Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China and the “Chinese Model” of Privatizing Large Financial Institutions, EUROPEAN J. FIN.
1 (2014).
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sector or at least introduce necessary institutions to improve its efficiency as
the revised property right theory suggests. In either case, the state needs to
take some form of transition.

Relative Theory

Early Development Phase

Critical Intersection
State Sector

Late Development Phase

Private Sector

That said, the relative theory does not predict any single form of
transition.
Specifically, ownership privatization, the best practice
prescription under the Washington Consensus,286 is not the only viable
option. As the revised property right theory has noted, state ownership of
banks is not always harmful, depending on the financial and political
institutions of an economy. Consequently, instead of privatizing SBs, an
economy can alternatively improve other institutions.287 The World Bank

286. John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN
ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 16 (John Williamson ed., 1990).
287. Bank privatization has its controversies. Empirical evidence found that privatized
banks did not necessarily produce superior financial performance. James A. Verbrugge, et al.,
State Ownership and the Financial Performance of Privatized Banks: An Empirical Analysis
(World Bank/Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Conference on Banking Privatization,
Washington, DC, March 15th & 16th, 1999) (finding that bank privatization in the 1990s
generally improved the operational and financial performance of privatized banks, but such
improvement was less pronounced than non-bank privatizations). Specifically, in developing
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researches, for example, have shifted their focus to corporate governance
reforms of SBs to substitute commercialization for privatization.288 That the
state needs to readjust its role in the banking sector does not necessarily mean
that it has to privatize SBs.
The experience of East Asian developmental states again supports this
point. Each of them pursued a different pattern of transition due to their
different economic and political background. Only South Korea adopted
large-scale privatization289 while Japan focused on regulatory reform,
Taiwan focused on market entry reform, and Singapore focused on corporate
governance reform. Privatization is merely one of the means to the end of
finding a proper state-market balance in an economy’s banking sector, not
the end itself.
It is perhaps the time for the Chinese party-state to reconsider its role in
the banking sector. In the past years, bad loans accumulated rapidly in
China’s banking sector. In six years, China’s bank NPL ratio has increased
from 0.95 percent in 2012290 to 1.83 percent in 2018,291 almost doubling, and
there have been no signs to suggest that this upward trend will cease. Even
more troubling is the pace of NPL accumulation in these four years. Between
2012 and 2018, the amount of NPLs has increased by more than RMB 1.5
trillion. Controlling the financial risks in China’s banking sector has become
countries, it is found that bank privatization failed to produce superior financial and operating
performance; often time the performance deteriorated. William L. Megginson, The
Economics of Bank Privatization, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 1931, 1951-58 (2005) (although it
also indicated that some studies found the superior performance of privatized banks in
transitional countries). Privatized banks in developing countries, compared with those in
developed countries, undertook more excessive risks. See generally Issac Otchere,
Competitive and Value Effects of Bank Privatization in Developed Countries, 33 J. BANKING
& FIN. 2373 (2009).
288. Specific recommendations include: requiring a clear mandate, aiming at specific
target sector, imposing the financial sustainability requirement, stipulating the rules of
cooperation with the private sector, positioning SBs as a complementary role, promoting the
participation of private banks, designing standards for measuring the public policy
performance of SBs, and periodically reviewing the needs of government ownership, etc. See
generally Herinz P. Rudolph, State Financial Institutions: Mandates, Governance, and
Beyond (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. WPS 5141, 2009); Scott, supra
note 41; Yaron, supra note 19.
289. Although Japan and Taiwan also adopted some bank privatization, the scale and pace
were never impressive.
290. CBIRC, The Table of Major Regulatory Indicators of Commercial Banks (Legal
Persons) (2012) (商业银行主要监管指标情况表(法人) (2012年)) (Mar. 1, 2013), http://
www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/doc/9106/910601/7E1679F277BC4161982E2BCF068E5DDA.html
291. CBIRC, The Table of Major Regulatory Indicators of Commercial Banks (Legal
Persons) (2018) (商业银行主要监管指标情况表(法人) (2018年)) (Feb. 25, 2019), http://
www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/doc/9106/910601/3954F0B0DF6C47F2AB36C1085791F448.html.
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a primary task for the Chinese party-state. At some point, CCP has to face
the reality that the current party-state dominated model is not sustainable and
start to experiment with a new state-private balance.
In a separate paper, I proposed China to adopt executive reforms to
transition toward a more commercialized SB system. In a nutshell, I
proposed CCP to recompose the executive team of China’s SBs and permit
the private block-holders of China’s SBs to appoint more bank executives. I
argue that such executive reform can facilitate the deliberation between the
party-state’s policy needs, as represented by party-state executives, and
operational efficiency, as represented by block-holder executives, and thus
help SBs to reach a better balance and safeguard their soundness.292 In
addition, such executive reform appears to be the most workable solution to
the rising risk exposure faced with by Chinese SBs now. For one thing,
considering that the size of Chinese SBs now is too big to be evened out by
new private banks, the market entry reform as adopted by Taiwan is less an
option to China. For another, in China’s banking practice, the executive team
plays a far more influential role than the board of directors in operating a
bank; hence, unlike Singapore’s case, reforms in China should focus on bank
executives instead of bank boards. On the other hand, considering that the
Chinese party-state’s back remains crucial for preventing market panics and
coordinating rescue actions, large-scale privatization of China’s SBs as
Japan’s or South Korea’s case is not a viable option as well. Hence,
maintaining the party-state’s presence and influence in the banking sector
but progressively introducing moderate and credible counterbalance from
private block-holders might fit China’s current economic and political
situation the most.
The U.S.-China trade war might offer a potential opportunity for China
to gradually transition to a banking system that is less dominated by the
party-state. At first glance, this prediction might seem counter-intuitive.
After all, the trade war can potentially deteriorate China’s financial sectors,
and the Chinese-party state might tighten instead of relaxing its control of
SBs to stabilize the financial system as the U.S. government did during the
Global Financial Crisis.293 That said, as the pressure from the United States
goes up, China might liberalize its financial sectors as a concession. In May
2018, as a response to the long criticism of its ceiling restriction imposed on

292. See Yang, The Cloud for Dragons and the Wind for Tigers, supra note 6, at 85-103.
293. And the government’s enhanced intervention can be an advisable move during a
financial crisis. For a related discussion in the U.S. context, see Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang,
Government Ownership of Banks: A Curse or a Blessing for the United States?, 10(3)
WILLIAM & MARY BUS. L. REV. 667 (2019).
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foreign investors on the shareholding of banks,294 CBIRC announced its plan
to abolish this restriction295 together with other liberalization measures relate
to other financial sectors such as securities and insurance. This amendment
might progressively increase the influence of foreign block-holders in
Chinese SBs. In a similar vein, considering that the United States long
criticizes the preferential lending practice of Chinese SBs and characterizes
it as an outrageous state subsidy,296 China might consider reducing its control
of the banking sector as a response in the future. The proposed executive
reform then may serve a middle ground acceptable to both the United States
and China: China can use it to claim that SBs are no longer the state’s conduit
and thus dilute the state subsidy argument while the United States sees some
significant concession from China. The impact of the U.S.-China trade war
on China’s banking sector remains to be observed.
V. Conclusion
China’s success in using SBs to promote economic development offers
contemporary literature a chance to reflect on the theory of SBs. The
property right theory might be correct about the weakness of the state sector,
but it overlooks that private sectors are likely to be even weaker in some
settings. In contrast, the development theory might be correct about the
relative strength of the state sector vis-à-vis private sectors, but it overlooks
the dynamism of an economy in which private sectors can grow and mature.
By proposing the relative theory which highlights the relative advantage and
disadvantage of the state sector vis-à-vis private sectors, I offer a more
balanced view of the SBs practice. Moreover, while acknowledging the
potential benefits of SBs, the relative theory also questions the sustainability
of the state’s domination of the banking sector. The Chinese party-state
should be cautioned that the success in the past does not guarantee victory in
the future. The proceeding U.S.-China trade war might push China’s
banking sector closer to the critical intersection depicted in the relative
theory, both economically and politically. The proud dragon needs to learn
when and how to repent!

294. Daniel C. Crosby, Banking on China’s WTO Commitments: “Same Bed, Different
Dreams” in China’s Financial Services Sector, 11(1) J. INT’L ECON. L. 75, 88-96 (2007).
295. CBIRC No. 5 Order (2018).
296. For a related discussion, see Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang & Pin-Hsien (Peggy) Lee, State
Capitalism, State-Owned Banks, and WTO’s Subsidy Regime: Proposing an Institution
Theory, 54(2) STAN. J. INT’L L. 117 (2018).

